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For much of his life, saint Al.¥;1Ustine was preoccupied with 
concerns related to the freedan of the In.mm will. If one traces his 
view of the hLmm will thro1.¥;Jbout his life, one notices a significant 
developnent. In his early writm;s 1tgainst the Manicbaeans he 
maintained that the origin of evil can be traced to evil choice. At the 
very end of his life he came to defend the position that the rnnan will 
did not have the ability to turn to God apart fran divine intervention. 
In this study I dEm)nstrate that Al.¥;1Ustine's view of the freedcm 
of the human will underwent a significant developnent during the first 
decade after his conversion to Christianity (386-397). To danonstrate 
this, I outline his position as it is found in his works durin;J three 
periods within this decade. The first period (386-391), before his 
ordination, is the period in which he held that the rnnan will has the 
freedan of indifference. In other words, it is possible for an 
individual to turn to God or to refuse to turn regardless of divine 
intervention. The second period (391-396), after his ordination and 
before his episcopacy, is the period in which, alt.ho\¥;1h still holding 
ii 
to the freedan of indifference, Augustine reoogni!7.ed to a much greater 
degree the stzuJgle in the lnmm will. The third period is his early 
years as bishop (396-400). DurmJ this time, Au;Justine held that it is 
impossible for an individual to turn to God without divine intervention 
and it is impossible to refuse to turn, if such intervention was 
granted. 
Finally, I briefly sketch three possible influences on this 
developnent. First, I shaw that it was Au:JU9tine's study of the 
scriptures which was, probably, the principal influence. Next, I 
discuss how his own moral and spiritual stzuJgle may have helped him 
realize the difficulty of IIIBlcmJ right moral choices. The third 
possible influence was his attanpt at refo:nning the moral and 
spiritual lives of those in his OOD;Jregation. These three factors may 
have helped Au:JU9tine recognize that it is only with the aid of divine 
intervention that an individual can turn to God. 
iii 
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V 
Augustine was a man driven by the problem of the existe:nc:e of 
evil in the world. This problem was the jq>etus for much of his work 
and thought. Each stage in his developnent was deeply influenced by the 
burning questions it raised. It drove him into Manichaeism and it was 
one of several issues that caused him to beoane disenchanted with it. 
His attraction to the Neo-Platonists was partly due to the insight they 
brought to the nature of evil. These insights were carried into his 
Christian world-view, upon his conversion, and, although sane of than 
remained intact ~bout his life, others were gradually transfoi:med 
into a m::>re consistently Christian ~ch to the problem. 
This transfo:cmation was not at all soooth. If the problem of evil 
served as a constant underlying force behind his thought, it was 
philosophical and theological controversy that was the anvil on which 
the specifics of his positions were continuously baDIDered out. As a 
result, a systematic exposition of Augustine's position on the problem 
of evil involves both a careful llllravelin;J of themes which are anbedded 
in specific polemical writin;Js and a scrupulous consideration of 
chronology. 
The two most llll)Ortant groups against which Augustine argued and 
which raised the problem of evil to the surface were the Manichees and 
1 
the Pelagians. The Manichees were a sect founded by Mani (d. 276). sane 
of their more significant beliefs included a dualistic view of reality, 
especially of good and evil, an absolute repudiation of faith or any 
religious authority as being against reason, and an ascetic approach to 
religious practice. 
It was the dualistic view of reality which presented an answer to 
the problem of evil. The Manichees believed that there existed two 
ultimate principles, the principle of Light, or acm,12',,1 (God) and the 
principle of Darkness, or Ahriman. 1 These were equal in power. They 
were engaged in an eternal war with each other. These were not 
spiritual beings, (Manichaeism is fundamentally materialistic), b1t 
they were, respectively, the source of goodness and the source of evil. 
In human nature, this dualism was ever present in that the body was a 
result of Evil and the soul (a material soul) derived fran the Good. 
The Manichees, a000rdingly, practiced asceticism, suppressing the body 
and anything related to the bodily appetites. 
This acoount attracted Au3UStine as a solution to the riddle of 
evil, as well as for its high view of reason. As Peter Brown relates: 
1 
2 
Qily this group, Au3UStine thou;Jht, could answer the question 
that had begun to "to:rment" him as soon as his "conversion" to 
philosophy bad caused him to think seriously: ''Fran what cause do 
we do evil?" The Manichaean answer to the problem of evil is the 
core of the Manichaeism of the young Au3UStine. 2 
See Frederick COpleston, A History of Philosophy: 
Medieval Philosophy: Augustine to Sootus, Vol. II, 
(Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1950) , p. 41. 
Peter Brown, AlXNStine of Hippo (Berkeley: 
university of california Press, 1967), p. 46. 
2 
Au;JUstine followed the sect for nine yea.rs. Even toward the end of 
his association with than, he took oanfort in their answers about evil; 
especially about the evil that was a part of his own experience. In the 
COnfessiones he wrote: 
For it still seaned to me "that it was not we that sin, tut that I 
know not what other nature sinned in us." And it gratified my pride 
to be free fran blame, and, after I had oc:mnitted any fault, not to 
acknowledge that I had done any,- "that Thou mightest beal my soul 
because it had sinned against Thee;" l::Jut I loved to excuse it, and 
to accuse sanethiD;J else (I "WOt not what) which was with me, l::Jut 
was not I. But assuredly ij was wholly I, and my iq;>iety bad 
divided me a')ainst myself. 
Finally it was the very th:iD]s for which he entered Manichaeism 
that pranpted him to leave. His growm;J disillusionment regardin;J 
Manichaeism was pranpted by, amo:rg other th:i.D]s, the inadequacy of 
their solution to the problem of evil. Portalie observes, "The fact of 
the matter was that the problem of evil always lx>thered him and the 
n:>re acquainted he became with Manichaeism, the less he was able to put 
his anxiety to rest. 114 
Ultimately, Au;JUstine remained puzzled; the dualistic solution 
turned out to be no solution at all. If Evil was just as powerful. as 
Good, why should one prefer one to the other? If God was of such a 
nature that he could be thwarted by a material principle; and if, in 
fact, he has been eternally thwarted, certainly God was not worthy of 
3 
4 
COnfessiones, v, 10, 18, trans. J. G. Pilkington 
in A select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Vol. I, ed. Philip SChaff, (Grand Rapids, 
Mich.: F.erdmans Publis~ CO., reprint 1983), 
Hereafter COnf. All citations to COnfessiones are to 
this edition. 
Eugene Portalie, A Guide to the Thought of Saint 
Augustine, trans. Ralph J. Bastian, (Chicago: Henry 
Regnery CCllpauy, 1960), p. 11. 
3 
devotion. Although disenchanted, Augllstine held on to the sect bcping 
for better answers to cane al01¥1. He drifted for a time into 
philosophical scepticism but in 386 he began reading sane of the works 
of Plotinus. :rt was the thought of the Neo-Platonists that freed him 
fran sane of the dead-ends of Manichaeism. 
Specifically, in the context of the prablan of evil, the 
Neo-Platonists Su;Jgested not only that Evil is not equal to Good (God 
or the one) but that evil is not even a substance at all. :rt bas no 
positive existence. :rt is but a lack, or a privation, of sane good 
within a subject. This view allowed ~tine to see bow God could be 
morally perfect and be the creator of everything without cbarging Him 
as the creator of evil. God did not create evil because evil is not a 
thing. ''And :r inquired what iniquity was, and ascertained it not to be 
a substance, but a perversion of the will, ••• 115 
The Neo-Platonists set the intellectual stage for Al.¥_1Ustine's 
conversion to Christianity in late AugUst of 386. 6 As a Christian, 
Augustine's early work was strongly influenced by Nao-Platonic thanes, 
After a very short time, he turned his literary attention to the sect 
fran which he bad emerged and launched a tarrage of tracts, letters and 
books which eventually devastated the Manichees. :rn these works, his 
developing position on the origin, nature and role of evil was central. 
one of the thanes which emerges in these works is the freedan of 
the individual will as the origin of evil. This is developed 
specifically in response to Manichaean detenninism. 1tgainst the 
------5 
6 
Oonf. , VII, 16, 22. 
see Peter :erown, p. 74. 
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Manichaean notion that the individual lnmm is a pawn in the oosmic 
struggle between the Good and the Evil Principles, Augustine posited 
the individual as being capable of and responsible for generating evil. 
Manichaeism held a strict deteminism. The evil a man did was a direct 
result of the evil principle within him. As we have seen, this was 
worked out in Au;1U5tine's own life as an excuse for his conduct. He was 
blameless; the Evil Principle was blameworthy. 
Once he bad grasped the :i.nplications of Meo-Platonism and bad 
becane a Christian, he realized that each individual bnman being was 
responsible for the wrong he or she did. ''Every man is the author of 
his evil deeds. 117 Au;1Uatine locates the authorship of the evil deed 
in the man h:imself. It is, as Au;1U5tine argues below, the mind itself 
which freely chooses evil. The lnDan will is oanpletely uncoeroed in 
this evil choosing. Augustine writes: 
So we are left with the conclusion that whatever is equal or 
superior to a ruling mind possessing virtue cannot make it serve 
lust because of its just character. And whatever is inferior cannot 
do it by reason of its weakness. So our argument teaches us: Nothing 
makes a mind a oonpanion of cupidity, except its own will and free 
choice. 8 
The origin of evil lay in the free choice of the will. It is this 
issue of the freedan of the lnmm will that was the substance of the 
second major controversy for Augustine. This was the controversy with 
the Pelagians. Pelagius, originally fran Britain, moved to Rane where 
7 
8 
De libero arbitrio, I, i, 1 in Augustine: Earlier 
writin;Js, trans. J.H.S. Burleigh, (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1953), Herefafter De lib art>. All 
references to De libero arbitrio are to this edition 
unless otherwise noted. 
Ibid., I, xi, 21. 
5 
he joined in discussions on Paul. out of these came his book, 
Expositions of the Letters of Saint Paul. In the year 411, ~ine 
was made aware of the nature of Pelagius' views and he began to marshal 
arguments against what he oonsidered to be heresy. The controversy 
lasted 1.mtil ~ine's death. In fact, his last work is an i'l')('!("ll{>lete 
work against Julian of Ecl.amn who was a follower of Pelagian ~t. 
Pelagians held that there is no such thing as original sin. The 
effect of the sin of .Mam on subsequent generations is siq;>ly that of a 
bad exaq;,le. Each person has a perfectly free will by which he or she 
can remain sinless. There is no bondage of the will and no need for any 
divine intervention. Grace, as Au;JUStine understood grace, is totally 
unnecessary. Grace, for Pelagians, is very different; it includes the 
initial gift of free will as well as other gifts of God such as, the 
D:>ral law, and Qirist's example and forgiveness for past sins. 
1qclinst the Pelagians, Au;JUStine emphasized original sin and the 
necessity for divine intervention in a person's life in order for that 
person to do any good deed or to have faith. In emphasizing original 
sin, Augustine was adamant that the effects of .Mam's sin plagued 
subsequent generations. Not only was evil introduced into the bJJDaD 
race and guilt transmitted, but every individual's freedan is inprlred 
by that first sin. While .Mam had the unhindered freedan to sin or to 
not sin, apart fran the grace of God, all of the rest of lnmmity is 
6 
only free to sin. 9 ~ine admitted that even pagaM could be 
virtuous. He insisted, however, that the virtues of pagans were also 
gifts fran. God. 10 
Of course the Pelagians denied that this could be called freedan 
at all. In fact they quoted passages out of De libero arbitrio and 
claimed that ~ine bad previously supported their position. 
Al~h never unwillin;J to admit that his views on many subjects 
developed, ~ine denied that be ever held beliefs that were 
Pelagian. 11 
Ever since Pelagius made the charge, the question bas been raised 
as to whether or not Au:JUStine's view of the freedan of the will had 
really c:him:Jed so radically. It is evident that there was significant 
developnent mt many charge that the "early ~ine'• was cx:mpletely 
contradicted by the "later ~ine'•. 
In actuality, the real developnent of Al.rgUstine' s view of banan 
freedan began shortly after be became a priest in 391. Many of his 




In Retractions, I, 8, 4 Au:JUStine writes, ''Unless 
this will, then, is freed by the grace of God fran. 
this servitude by which it bas been made 'servant of 
sin, ' ••• , mortal men cannot live rightly and 
devoutly." trans. Sister Mary Inez Bogan in The 
Fathers of the Church, Vol. 60, (Washington D.C.: 
catholic university Press, 1968), Hereafter Retr. 
see g>istle, 138, 3, 17, trans. J. G. Clmningham in 
Philip SChaff ed. The Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Vol. I, First Series (reprint Grand 
Rapids, Mich.: F.erdmaDS 1983), Hereafter _R?. 
see Retr., I, a, 3-6. In section 4 Al.rgUstine writes, 
"In these and similar statements of mine, because 
there was no mention of the grace of God, which was 
not the subject under discussion at the time, the 
Pelagians think or may think that we held their 
opinion. But they are mistaken in~ this." 
7 
heard of Pelagius. Althou;Jh the oontroversy with the Pelagians occupied 
a great deal of Au;JUStine's time and energy, be was :basically def'ending-
a:nd awlying- the position he had already worked out. Gilson writes: 
[W] e are inclined to consider useless the di sc,JSsion of Pelagius' 
influence on his doctrine of liberty. How oould his task of 
OR)OsiDg' Pelagian error possibly lead him to exaggerate the rights 
of grace and jeopardize free choice, if it is true that be never 
questioned free choice and if, m:>reover, be ascribed everything to 
grace since the day he read and understood st. Paul? st. Augustine 
was never to go any further because he went at once as far as one 
can go: Man can only do what God gives him the strEDJtb to 
do • 12 I • • • 
Before we shall be able to recognize the developnent of 
Augustine's view of the freedan of the will, we shall have to gain a 
greater understanding- of Augustine's use of his key tams. At first 
glance, the tems ''will" and "choice'' appear to be interchangeable. In 
fact, there is a slight difference in meaning-. ''Will" (voluntas) is 
used to refer to the m:>ral individual himself. Iavid Mosher explains: 
12 
13 
Augustine's definition [of ''will"] points beyond choice to a whole 
movement or tendency or posture of the soul, of which individual 
choices are sinply manifestations. It therefore follows fran the 
definition that will is the individual himself, but the individual 
viewed as the source of all his thou;Jhts, feeling's and actions as 
well as of all his choices. However, when understood this way, will 
for st. Augustine finally and m:>st importantly beoaDes almost 
synonymous with the notion of ''m:>ral self'' or ''m:>ral personality," 
i.e. , the individual as m:>ral agent, because it is by reason of the 
quality of its thou;Jhts, feeling's, actions and choices that the 
self is judged to be m:>rally good or l:lad. 13 
Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of saint 
Augustine, trans. L.E.M. Lynch (New York: Randall 
House, 1960), p. 160. Hereafter, Gilson. 
David L. Mosher, 11st. Augustine on Freedan," Crux 
Vol. XII (1974-75) P• 20. 8ee also John M. Rist, 
''Augustine on Free Will and Predestination," in 
Augustine: A COllection of critical Essays ed. R. 
A. Markus (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1972), 
p. 220. 
8 
The will, as the iooral self, is free in that it is unoc:upelled or 
1m00erced. Nothing forces the will to act one way or another. If the 
movement of the will is one which merits either praise or blame, it 
must be a voluntary movement. ~ine points this out: 
Moreover, unless the movement of the will towards this or that 
object is voluntary and within our power, a man would not be 
praiseworthy when he turns to the higher objects nor blamewoU11Y 
when he turns to lower objects, usin3' his will like a hinge. 
In the often used phrase, ''Free Choice," ''Choice'' (arbitriun) 
refers to "the deliberative and decision making role of the will in 
the life of the soul. 1115 This is free (l:ibenln) in that it is 
unoanpelled and therefore it is that for which the soul is m::>rally 
accountable. 
The view that the choice of the will is one for which the will is 
ioorally accountable because it is voluntary and unooeroed is a view to 
which both a oc:q>at:ibilist and an iT\t'YJT{)i\+-ibilist may agree. It may be 
sanething of an anachronism to use tams such as "oc:q>at:ibilism'' and 
"incxq>atibilism'' when referrin3' to ~ine's position on the freedan 
of the will. This is because ~ine' s concerns seem far ranoved fran 
the concerns of those who are involved in the contemporary controversy 
over this issue. Still, these tams can be useful to clarify an 
important distinction in ~ine. 
14 
15 
In this study I shall use the term "incxlrpatibilism'' for the view 
De lib arb., III, i, 3. 
David Mosher, 11st. Au:JUStine on Freedan," p. 20. 
9 
that a choice between two options is free only if it is within the 
power of the individual to choose either of the two options without any 
change in antecedent conditions. This is sanetimes referred to as the 
freedan of indifference. It must be kept in mind that Augustine's 
central concern in discussing the freedan of the will is in moral and 
spiritual choices. The question is whether or not it is within the 
power of a person's will to turn to God or to refrain fran sinning. 
koordingly when I shall discuss antecedent conditions, in the 
context of this study, I shall always be referring to the intervention 
of God in a person's willing. In other words, is it within the power of 
a person's will to turn to God without any intervention by God, or is 
God's intervention a necessary antecedent condition of willing to turn 
to Him? An inc::,arpa+ibilist answer is that it is possible for a person's 
will to turn to God without divine intervention. There are no 
antecedent conditions which must be introduced in order to enable the 
will to choose rightly. 
By the term "ocq,atibilism'' I shall mean the view that divine 
intervention is both a necessary and sufficient antecedent condition in 
order for the will to be able to turn to God or to refrain fran 
sinning. Without this intervention the will can only choose to turn 
away fran God. When God intervenes, a person cannot refuse to turn to 
Him. 
The term ''voluntary," however, is used differently by those who 
adhere to ocq,atibilism and those adhering to :inoaJpltibilism. For the 
i.noc:trpatibilist a choice is free if it is voluntary in the sense that 
it is one in which the person has the freedan of indifference, i.e., 
10 
either of the two options is within the power of the individual. 
The oanpatibilist will also insist that a choice is free in that 
it is voltmtary. By "voltmtary," however, he means that the choice is 
in accordance with the will even if the will does not have the ability 
to choose the other option, given no change in antecedent conditions. 
In this way a choice can be necessary (in that there was only one 
option within the power of the will) and it can be free (in aooordanoe 
with the will) at the same time. 
~tine seems not to have differentiated between these positions 
in the use of his tenni:nology. We shall see, however, that in his early 
writings, before his ordination, he seems to have held an 
i.noalpltibilist position. The will is the cause of the choice while it 
is itself not caused by anything else. When the will chooses one 
option, it oauld have chosen the other option; even if every other 
antecedent condition was the same. 
In his works inmecUately after his oonsec:ration as bishop (and 
long before the Pelagian controversy) , Augustine lays a great deal more 
anphasis on God's grace as a necessary condition of the will's ability 
to choose the good in a given situation. While in many non-moral 
situations, perhaps, the will oauld have chosen either option without a 
change in antecedent conditions, in a DMmll choice the will does not 
have the capacity to choose both options. only if God's grace is 
present can the will choose rightly. The choice of good or evil is 
still voltmtary but grace is necessary in order to choose the good. 
God's grace is also a sufficient condition in the will's choosing the 
11 
good. If God intervenes by sending Bis grace, the will will turn to 
Him. It is not within the power of the individual. to refuse to turn to 
God, if Bis grace is present. This is a version of oanpatibilism. 
While the Manichaean and Pelagian disputes are usually seen as the 
major cxmtroversies which gave inpetus to Augustine's wri~ on the 
Problan of Evil and the freedcm of the will, there were other events 
and influences which shaped his thought as well. 0lle of these was the 
change in his vocation and in his sense of personal calling during the 
first decade after his conversion. 
It is not insignificant that the most flmdarnental developnents in 
Augustine's view of the freedan of the will occurred during the period 
in which his life calling underwent the most profound changes. He began 
his Christian life, in 386, with a vision to pursue a life of sheltered 
contemplation and study. By 391 he had been ordained priest and within 
a very short time, his bishop, Valerius, broke with accepted practice 
and allowed Augustine to preach. ''Within two years, Valerius' new 
acquisition was patiently explaining the creed to the assembled 
catholic bishops of Africa! 1116 only two years after this, in 395, he 
was oonsecrated oo-adjutor bishop. In 396 Valerius died and Augustine 
became bishop of Hippo, where he served rmtil he died in 430. 
The wri~ which Augustine produced during this first decade 
after his oonversion follow closely his sense of vocation and calling. 
The style of each book, the problEIIIS it develops and the methods 
employed to solve them all reflect the ooncerns uppemost in 
Augustine's mind at the time of writing. These concerns were dictated 
16 Peter Brown, p. 139. 
12 
largely by his vocation and bow he perceived his life work. 
In the early dialogues, we meet a very Nao-Platonic philosopher 
trying to reach the truth and the vision of God t.hrcuJh an ascent of 
reason. In Book III of De libero arbitrio (written about 395) be is 
wrestli?q with the iq:,lications of a specifically biblical doctrine 
such as the fall. By 397, in the work De diversis guaestionibls ad 
Simplicianum, be is doi?q a serious exegetical study of one of the ioost 
difficult passages in Paul and be is attanpti?q to relate the text to 
concerns about the freedan of the will. 
My thesis, in this study, is that there was a very significant 
developnent in Au;Justine 1 s view of the freeckm of the will during this 
period. Au;Justine began by boldm:3' the incmpa+-.ibilist position, as we 
have described it. By 397 be bad cane to bold the axnpatibilist view. 
God's grace came to be seen as a necessary and sufficient condition to 
the turnilxJ of an individual's will to God. Given the changes in 
Au;Justine 1 s life through this period, there were three issues which, it 
may be SUNested, may have influenced this developnent. The first of 
these is that Augustine, as a priest, began to study the seriptures 
ioore diligently than ever before. The responsibility of regularly 
preach:m;J forced him to pore over the texts and try to grasp and 
oamnmicate their meanings accurately. 
The second possible influence was his own contimrl.ng str\¥;1gle to 
live a holy life. His desire of an ascent of reason to a vision of God, 
in this life, was rapidly shown to be only a dream. The reality of sin 
and sin's effect in the habits of the will became all too clear and may 
have caused him to see human freedan in a different light. 
13 
A third influence may be suggested. Perhaps, in his desire to 
persuade his congregation to live holy lives, be was faced with, not 
only the sluggishness of his own will, :tut the m:>ral difficulties of 
the average fourth century Christian. This was most likely the least 
powerful. influence on his mind and it bas been very rarely alluded to 
in the literature. Nevertheless, there is sane reason to believe that 
this may have played a role in the developnent of Augustine's view of 
the freedan of the will. 
To pursue this I shall first set out Augustine's early view of 
human freedan, held fran 386-391, especially as it is expounded in De 
libero arbitrio Book I. I shall also draw fran other works of this same 
period. Next I shall explain the view be held between his ordination 
and his consecration as bishop (391-395), focussiD:J on the second and 
third books of De libero arbi trio. After that I shall explain the later 
view Augustine expressed in De diversis guaestionil::Jus ad Simplicianum 
Book I, QUestion 2 (397). I shall also refer to the COnfessiones. 
once the differences in Augustine's positions are ma.de clear, I 
shall briefly sketch each of the possible influences on this 
developnent, beginning with the influence of Scripture. In this I shall 
discuss Augustine's treatment of the ninth chapter of Ranans in three 
separate works, the Exposi tio guanmdam propositionum ex Epistola ad 
Rana.nos, the De diversis quaestionil::Jus LXXXIII, and the De diversis 
guaestionil::Jus ad Simplicianum. The influence of his own m:>ral struggle 
will be drawn fran the COnfessiones and various letters. The influence 
of the struggle of his congregation will be illustrated fran letters 
and sezmons. 
14 
I shall conclude that it may have been in response to these three 
influences that Augustine's view of lnmm freedan developed durin:1 the 
period between his conversion in 386 and the writilq of his 
Oonfessiones in 397. 
15 
AUGUS'l'INE'S VIEW OF 'DIE Fl<EEOCIIJ. OF 'DIE WILL 
FR:H CXlNVERSION 'l'O ORDINM'ION 
AugUstine was converted to Christianity in A1¥;JUSt of 386. 1 It is 
perhaps no exaggeration to say that the next few years of his life were 
shaped as much by the life he left as by his new life as a Christian. 
This is true of both the content and the perspective of his earliest 
works. In fact, sane of his pre-conversion influences remained 
throughout his life. There was also another way in which his 
philosophical history influenced his early years as a Christian. This 
was in his understanding of his own life calling. 
stories and rumors about Christian ascetics and 100nasteries 2 
oanbined with the Nao-Platonic teachiiq of the soul's ascent to 
fulfillment through contemplation 3 forged A1¥;JUStine's view of what 
constituted the best life for a Philosopher and Christian. This was the 
life of the mind. He would pursue a life in which he could be free to 
think, converse and contemplate. Augustine's plan, just prior to his 




For at least a year, Augustine had regarded sane follll of this 
life 11in Philosophy'• as the only possible life for himself. But he 
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bad intended to retire gracefully into such a life. He would marry 
a rich and, so he hoped, a well educated heiress. He would serve 
the short spell of J:OUtine administration required of a cultured 
local governor. SUpported by his wife's estates and protected by 
the senatorial privileges of a fozmer adrnini~tor, be f'111-d have
found himself free, in a few years, to follow his clream. 
Upon his conversion, however, ~ abandoned any plans of 
marriage. He still desired to 11retreat 11 and clevote birnSAlf exclusively 
to Philosophy. At the end of the tem in which he tau;;ht rhetoric, 
Augustine retired to the estate of a friend at cassiciacum where he was 
joined by faithful friends and students as well as his JOOther, Monica. 
Shortly thereafter, he resigned fran his post as teacher of rhetoric 
and devoted himself to Philosophy. Recalluq this sane eleven years 
later in the Confessions, Augustine writes that cassiciacum was, •'Where 
fran the fever of the world we found rest in Tbee, ••• 115 Brown writes: 
When Augustine retired to cassiciacum, in septembP..r 386, he 
would have appeared to be followuq a lOD;J-established and 
delightful tradition: delivered fran the cares of a public career, 
he was about to enter upon a life of creative leisure, dedicated to 
serious pursuits. This was the ancient ideal of 1'0tium li.beral.e'•, 
of a "cultured retirement"; and loo~ back upon this period of 
his life, Augustine oould speak of it as a time of •'Christianae 
vitae otium'', a •'Christian otium'•. This ideal was to fo:cn the 
background of Augustri9 1 s life fran that time until his ordination 
as a priest, in 391. 
It was at this retreat that Augustine's first four books 
originated. These demonstrate the confidence he bad in the 
philosophical methodology he bad adopted. When he didn 1 t have the 
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answer is just out of his grasp. This confidence is also sbawn by the 
depth and difficulty of the topics which be tackled. Augustine refutes 
philosophical scepticism in contra ~itiOS, investigates the nature 
of truth and of the rnJMD soul in the Soliloguia, addresses the highest 
end of rn:nnan life in De beata vita, and writes on the place of evil in 
a universe created and sustained by God in De ordine. 
At Easter in 387 Augustine and Alypius left cassiciacum to be 
baptized by ~rose in Milan. They never went ba.clt. Plans to retum to 
Africa were pursued but a series of chaI¥;1es far greater than si.q)ly 
those of geography were oil the horizon, beginning with the death of 
Monica. Au;Ustine m::,urned privately and deeply. 
There were delays in Rane (where be began to write De libero 
amitrio) and Augustine's party did not reach carthage in Africa 1.mtil 
late 388. They settled on Augustine 1 s family property in Thagaste as a 
However, 
as Peter Brown points out, there was a shifti!¥'J focus: 
Thagaste oould never be another cassiciacum. Even during his 
stay in Rane, Au;Ustine's writi!¥'Js shaw a new detennination. Fran 
that time onwards, he intended to live a secluded life no longer, 
as in Milan, on the fringe of a society of intellectual laymen, but 
clirectlJ in the shadow of the organized life of the catholic 
Church. 
The two years in Thagaste were marked with the deaths of 
Augustine's close friend Nebridius and his own son, .Meodatus. These 
losses, in addition to the bitter controversy which raged between the 
local catholics and Manichaeans, seened to drive him into a ioore active 
7 Peter Brown, p. 132. 
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life. In 390 he writes to OOelestinus: 
Oh haw I wish that I could oontimm] ly say one thiig to you! 
It is this: Iet us shake off the blrden of unprofitable cares, and 
bear only those which are useful. For I do not know whether 
anything like 0e111>lete exeuption fran care is to be hoped for in 
this 110rld. 8 
It was at Thagaste that several 110rks were written and others 
begun. The earliest and m:>st philosophical questions in the De diversis 
guaestionibus LXXXIII were written in this period. 9 In the 110rk De 
Magistro, Augustine and Adeodatus converse on the memrlD;J of signs and 
the relationship between 110rds and reality. In Devera religione 
Augustine argues, against Manichaeism, that both authority and reason 
are means to truth and that the truth of Christianity is reasonable and 
oanpelli.D;1. 
As if he sensed his future, Augustine pw:posely avoided towns 
which were in need of bishops in order to avoid beiD;J forced into the 
job. When Augustine travelled to Hi:wo in 391, he was secure in the 
knowledge that Hi:wo had a bishop. He was suzprised to be ordained to 
the priesthood nearly by force. 
Fran his conversion to his ordination, Augustine had attempted to 
carve out the kind of life that afforded study and contemplation. He 
was, however, increasi.D;1ly thrust closer to active church life and to 
the center of the major theological controversies of his time. As we 
shall see in the next chapter, once be was ordained and he took on the 
8 
9 
,Ip., 18, 1. 
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burden of the pastoral life, arry time for leisurely study was squeezed 
out by his responsibilities to his new calling. 
~'S View of the Freedan of the Will 
in the cassiciacun Dialogues 
Not surprisingly, Augustine's earliest works :bear the heaviest 
staq;, of his Nao-Platonism. This is particularly evident in the 
subjects and methods with which he was preoccupied. In each of the four 
dialogs OCllp)Sed or beglm at cassiciacum, the central focus is general 
and speculative. Even when the topics intersect with the concerns of 
individual bnman beings, they are dealt with in a rmiversal and 
abstract manner. 
In De ordine, for example, ~ writes about the place of 
evil in a world controlled by God. This appears to be an issue which 
'WOul.d elicit concern aver and analysis of concrete situations. Instead 
the discussion remains very general. Even when the participants are 
distracted with a cock fight, 10 they quickly nw::,ve fran specific 
observations to rmiversal laws. 
This same pattern is seen in the SOliloguia in which Augustine 
implores his own reason, 11 (Aug.) I desire to know God and the soul. 
(Reason) Nothing more? (Aug.) No~ whatever. 1111 Al thol.gh an 
investigation into the nature of the soul could bring up many issues 
10 
11 
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relatilY;J to particular lnlnan beings, Au;JUstine's d;smssion begins and 
ends in the eternal and al:>stract. 
It is not surpris~, given the focus of these early dialogues, 
that ~tine does not address the freedan of the will in any detail. 
He made pass~ ocmnents about the existence of free will tut there is 
no position that is explicitly articulated, let alone defended. It is 
only as he oonfronted Manicbaeism and he had to aooomit for the origin 
of evil that he developed what could be oonsidered a theory about the 
nature of lnmm freedan. 
~ine' s acknow.1 edgment of the existence of free will is seen 
in his introductory prayer in the SOliloguia in which he oarment-s that 
it is by God's laws that the soul is free: 
In all that I say cane to 'rrrJ aid, Thou who art alone God, ••• by 
whose laws, established forever, the unstable movement of mutable 
thiD1s is not pennitted to be disordered, tut is ever rec!uced to 
awarent stability by the reins which hold in the revolving ages; 
by whose laws the soul's will is free, and by unalterable necessity 
rewards are distr:ihtted to the good and pmisments to the evil. 
God, fran whan all good things flow down to us, and by wban all 
evilJs warded off fran us, above whan is nothing, ••• Bear me, 'rrrJ 
God. 
In De beata vita, Augustine opens by explaining why so few people 
reach "the port of philosophy -fran which, indeed, one enters to the 
hinterland of the haWY life-. 1113 He briefly alludes to the existence 
of the will in the pass~ ocmnent: 
12 
13 
For, since God or nature or necessity or our own will, or a 
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oanbination of sane or all of these, would have us founder in this 
world heedlessly and :t;,y chance as in a stonily sea- the matter is 
indeed 14 not clear, ••• 
Augustine says a little m=>re in a passage in De ordine: 
But who is so dull of mind that he will hesitate to attrib.Jte 
to divine power and divine goverment whatever there is of ~er in 
coi:porea.l operations, apart fran hllnan ancmianent and will? 
Fran these brief references to free will, it is i:q:,ossible to 
derive a full-fledged theory of hllnan freedan. It is not clear whether 
or not Augustine held to any theory at this t:ilne. He clearly believed 
in the existence of free will. He is anpbasiziDJ, in the De ordine, 
that God's providence over "corporeal operations" is OClll)lete up to, at 
least, the danain of hman freedan. ADi1W3tine says nothing, here, al:lout 
the capacities or the nature of this will. 
That there is no theory of free will in this work is significant 
in that evil is not linked to choice as in later works. Augustine does 
not even raise the question of evil's origin. It is divine order and 
providence that is his primary concern. 
The Freedan of the Will in the works 
Imnediately Beyond Cassiciacln 
It is in the next few years that the freedan of the will beoaDes 
m=,re inp)rtant for Augustine. Shortly after leaving cassiciacun, 
Augustine wrote two pieces that followed in the style of the 
-------14 
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cassiciacun dialogues. De :imnortalitate animae was written in 387 and 
De quantitate animae was written in 387-388. ~tine says little in 
either about the freedan of the will. There is, however, a statanent 
concerning choice near the very end of De guantitate anima~ that does , 
merit attention: 
To the soul, indeed, is given free choice, and they who 
endeavor to unde:nnine it with futile reasoni.D;Js are so blind that 
they do not understand that of their own will they are voicing 
these absurd and :inpious statanents. And the gift of free choice is 
such that, ma.1tin] use of it in any way whatever, the soul does not 
disturb any portion of divine order and law. It is conferred by the 
all wise and all prevailing Lord of all creation. 16 
~tine asserts two :inportant statanents in this passage. First, 
he asserts that it is obviously true that lnlDims are endowed with free 
choice. Choice is a gift to the soul. In fact, he clams, one could not 
argue against the existence of free will without choosing to so argue 
and thereby dEm:>nstrati.ng that the will is free. 
second, ~ine asserts that by the exercise of the will, a 
person cannot "disturb any portion of divine order and law." JUst as we 
are cautious in atteq>ti.ng to extract a systan fran the one sentence in 
De ordine, it must be .rEIJ'IEIN")P..red that this too is a very brief cxmnent; 
one not of sufficient 14m;Jth or depth to warrant the extraction of a 
full theory of the will. 
It does sean, however, to be more clear than the other passage. 
The freedan of the will is given by God J::ut it is sanehow limited in 
what it can acoanplish. It is not that ~ine is stating that the 
16 De guantitate animae, 36, 80 trans. John J. 
Mc.Mahon in The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 4 (Imwi.g 
Schq:.p 1947), Hereafter De guant anim. 
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divine will limits the options open to the h\Dan will. Rather, he 
states that even when h\Dan beiD;Js make use of their wills in any way 
whatever, divine order is preserved. ~ine does not explain bow the 
divine order takes into account any possible movement of the will. It 
is not that he is sayin:J that God's order is decreed in response to the 
human choosil¥;Js. Nor is it that God's order eliminates any real 
freedan. 6aDebow God's plan includes and is not hindered by the real 
choices people make. 
It is not until Au;1Ustine en:;iages in his anti-Manicllaean polanics 
that he articulates the relationship between the origin of evil and 
wrorKJful free choices. It is in this context that he is forced to 
develop and articulate a theory of human freedan. 
The Freedan of the Will in De Libero Arbitrio Book I 
Augustine's treatise De libero arbitrio is the first of his works 
which include a clearly articulated position on the nature of human 
freedan. Augustine began to write it in Rane in 388 blt did not 
oanplete it until 395. 17 There was m::>st likely a great time lapse 
between the writi.D;J of Book I and that of Book II. 18 The purpose of 
this work is well stated by Kaufman: 
17 
18 
The intention of Au;1Ustine's earliest treatise on free choice 
was not to explore the range of the will's operation (with or 
without divine assistance) • The treatise was rather a rebuttal to 
the Manichaean argument that the God who created all thil¥;Js was 
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responsible for the existence of evi1. 19 
AugUstine, directinJ his attacks against the Manicbaeans, thus 
anphasizes the privative nature of evil, that all created thinJs are 
good in themselves and that evil has its origin in the misused freedan 
of the In.mm will. It is out of these themes that a position on the 
nature of bl.lnan freedan can be discovered. 
Book I opens with Evodius ~, ''whether God be not the author 
of evil 11•20 Augustine readily acknowledges that he already believes 
that God exists and that God is not responsible for evil. His 
investigation is to determine whether or not these thinJs can be 
demonstrated by reason. Therefore he attali>ts to l:Juild or discover 
aooounts of evil, responsibility, freedan and the will that are 
consistent with this position. Because, as Augustine ass\DeS, God is 
just, only vol1mtary evil is punished. He writes, ''God is not the 
author of the evil a man does tbou;Jh He is the author of the evil a man 
suffers." and ''EVery evil man is the author of bis evil deeds. 1-21 
Evodius asks for the "cause why we do evil. 1122 In begimli.ng to 





[A]ll thiD;1s that exist are fran one God; and yet God is not the 
author of sins. The difficulty for the mind is this. If sins 
originate with souls which God has created, and which therefore 
have their origin fran God, bow are sins not to be charged against 
Peter Iver :Kaufman, ''The Lesson of conversion: A 
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God at least mediately? 23 
Before one can discover why bJJmans do evil, AD;JUstine claims, one 
DDJSt grasp the nature, or the essence, of evil. What exactly is evil? , 
What is it that makes an act or thou;Jht evil? AD;JUstine considers and 
rejects the views that what makes sanethm3' evil is that it is a 
violation of a civil law and the view that an act is evil because of 
the lust which 11c:x,c:mpmies it. Evil, then, is discovered to be 
disorder, and goodness order. 
Briefly to express in words as best I can the idea of eternal law 
as it is 91:aJrped upon our minds I s~d say this: it is just that 
all thm:Js should be in perfect order. 4 
If the essence of goodness is perfect order, evil is disorder. 
~tine takes this idea of perfect order and the OC111?lementary idea 
of disorder and applies than to hman existence. Perfect order in man 
is defined as: 
Whatever it is that puts man above the beasts, mind or spirit 
(perhaps it is best called by :both names, for we find both in the 
divine scriptures), whatever it is called, if it daninates and 
rules the other~ of which man is OC111?0sed, then a man is most 
perfectly ordered. 
It is the reason of a man which should rule the rest of him. The 
question arises ooncerni.D;J whether or not it is even poss:il:>le for 
reason so to rule. Perhaps sane other part of the nature of man, such 
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to this ~estion is that since it is true that the mind should rule, 
it must be stron;ier than lust. It would be inconsistent with good order 
for that which should rule to be weaker than that which should be 
ruled. For Augustine, reason is stron;ier than lust. 
This position that the mind is stron;ier than lust (or any other 
vice) 'beoanes an important premise in the argunent that nothilg forces 
the human mind to do evil. Evil is freely chosen. If the mind is n:>re 
powerful than lust and if virtue is more powerful than vice, ''then no 
vicious [vice-filled] soul can overoane a soul amed with virtue. 1126 
If a vicious soul cannot overoane a virtuous soul and force it to do 
evil, certainly, Augustine argues, no corporeal object (inferior to any 
soul in virtue of its corporeal nature) can force a virtuous soul to do 
evil either. 
The only thin;Js more powerful than a virtuous soul would be other 
greater virtuous souls (God and an;iels). Althol¥Jh these have more power 
than a lnlDim soul, in light of their virtue, they would not influence a 
human soul for evil. 
26 
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At present we can be sure that whatever it be that may rightly 
excel a mind stron;i in virtue, it cannot be l.mjust in any way. so 
that not even it, though it have the power, will canpel a mind to 
serve lust •••• so we are left with the conclusion that whatever is 
equal or superior to a rulin;J mind possessin;J virtue cannot make it 
serve lust because of its just character. And whatever is inferior 
cannot do it by reason of its weakness. so our argument teaches us: 
Nothin;J makes a~ a oanpal'lion of cupidity, except its own will 
and free choice. 
As Babcock explains, ''The mind cannot be canpelled either 
Ibid., I, x, 20. 
Ibid., I, xi, 21. 
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internally or externally. Qlly the exercise of its own will, its own 
agency, can make it serve lust. It is, therefore, the author of its own 
evil. 1128 ~ine concludes that it is by the soul's own free 
choice, l.Ul00erC8d by anything, that it wills evil. There is no outside 
CXl!pll.sion which forces a soul to choose evil. 
In the next brief section, however, ~ine argues that the 
souls of existing bl.mm beings are, in fact, not unbjme.red. The 
penalty of sin affects the very capacity to consistently choose 
correctly. 
Is it to be regarded as in itself a small penalty that the soul is 
daninated by lust, spoiled of its resources of virtue, drawn hither 
and thither in abject poverty, naw ~ falsehood as if it 
were truth, now acting on the defensive, now rejecting what it had 
foDDerly approved bit none the less falling into other falsehoods, 
now holding its assent back, and often fearing the D:>St obvious 
reasonings, now despairing of ever f:indjng the truth and sticking 
in the dark pit of folly, naw attempting to reach the light of 
intelligence, and again falling back in sheer weariness? Meantime 
the cupidities exercise their daninion tyrannically and disturb the 
man's whole mind and life with varying and contrary teq,ests, fear 
on one side, longing on the other; here anxiety, there vain and 
false rejoicing; here torture because Sallething loved bas been 
lost, there eagerness to obtain what it does not possess; here 
grief for injury suffered, there incitanents to seek revenge. 
Wherever it turns it can be restricted by avarice, wasted by 
luxury, bound by ambition, inflated by pride, tortured by &fNY, 
enveloped in sloth, excited by wantonness, afflicted by subjection, 
suffering all the other ~tless Em>tions which inhabit and 
trouble the realm of lust. 9 
~ine asserts that the present condition of the rnnan soul is 
not natural. It is the just penalty for sin. He asks of this, ''Can we 
think that a condition like that is not penal, when we see that 
28 
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it must be undergone by all who do not cleave to wisdan? 30 The hanan 
soul in its natural state is unbimered in its rule aver the rest of 
the person. This natural state is bow the soul was originally created 
by God before sin entered the world. once sin became a factor, both 
ignorance and impotence weighs cSown each h1Dan soul. 
Evodius, seeiDJ this ignorance and illp>tence, m:gues that these 
can be the just penalty for sin only 11if anybody placed on the height 
of wisdan should choose to descend and beoome a servant to lust. 1131 
Only if the will of a person is unhindered could the choice to sin be 
called free or voluntary. If the weight of impotence was such that the 
person oould not choose to be either good or evil, any subsequent 
penalty would be unjust. It seems, reports Evodius, that no person 
beyond the first had ever been free, in this sense, fran the hindering 
effects of the penalty for sin. If this is the case, it seems that the 
human will is not free to avoid sin and any penalty is unjust. 
Au:JUstine's response is that it is within the power ·of each 
indivictual to have a good will or not to have a good will. If one 
eagerly desires to be wise, one will have a good will. The very desire, 





You see, then, I imagine, that it is in the power of our will 
to enjoy or to be without so great and so true a good. For what is 
so oanpletely within the power of the will as the will itself? 
Whoever has a good will has sanethiD]' which is far better than all 
earthly realms and all bodily pleasures. Whoever does not have it, 
lacks that which is more excellent than all the goods which are not 
in our power, and yet be can have it by williD]' it sinply. 32 
Ibid. 
Ibid., I, xi, 23. 
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Evodius 1 question was that be could not understand bow it could be 
a just penalty for a soul which was never vise to t,e sbackl.ed by 
ignorance and impotence. ~'s position is that even if one bas , 
never been wise, it is still within one's power to choose, here and 
new, to have a good will. This choice is, in essence, the choice to 
pursue wisda:n eagerly. Ignorance and :illp>tenoe, then, are the just 
penalty for refusing to have a good will and so to pursue wisda:n. As 
Benjamin and Hackstaff translate: 
Therefore, if we should love and embrace with our will the 
good will, and place it before all other things that we cannot keep 
even if we will to do so, then those virtues, as reason 
demonstrates, will dwell in our spirit, and to possess them is to 
live rightly and honorably. Fran this it is established that 
whoever wants to live rightly and honorably, if his will for this 
surpasses his will for ten;;,oral goods, achieves this great good so 
easily ~t to have what he wills is nothing other than the act of 
willing. 
It is clear in this translation that wanting to live rightly is 
not ellC>u;Jh. It is essential that one has a will for this which 
"surpasses his will for ten;;,oral goods." once one has that will, it is 
easy to have what one wills because there is no difference between the 
act of willing and having what one wills. This is beca:11se one is 
33 De lib arb. I, xi11, 29 trans. Anna s. Benjamin and 
L. H. Hackstaff, (Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, 
·1964). This passage is labeled section 97 in this 
edition. 
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already willing a good and honorable life. 34 
In this passage, it is unclear whether or not AugUstine is 
explicitly asserting that it is within the power of a person's will, 
apart fran any divine intervention, to desire the right and honorable ' 
life enou:;Jh to attain it. Fran the context, however, it can be 
concluded that AD;1Usti.ne holds that we are justly held responsible for 
pursuin;J or refusing to pursue the good will. 
If it is true that the good will can and sbould be pursued, the 
next question is, why is it that not every person is baR?Y? Obviously 
every person wishes to be happy. AtXJUStine, once again, points out the 
distinction between wishing and willing. one who wishes to be happy 
might still not will to have a good will because be might not be ready 
to accept the righteous standard of living which necessarily 
aci:xanpanies a good will. 
It is not su.tprising that unhappy men do not obtain what they wish, 
that is, a happy life. For they do not at the same time wish its 
acc:x:,rpaniment, without which no one is wo~ of it, and no one 
obtains it, that is to say a righteous life. 5 
To will a good will involves willing aooording to the eternal law 
which dernancls right living as a means to baR)iness. Many wish to be 
happy but do not will it because they refuse to will what is necessary 
in order to obtain it. AugUstine explains: 
34 
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It seems that Babcock (''AU:JUSti.ne on sin and Moral 
Agency," p. 36) misunderstands this text. He states 
that living rightly is, first, to be preferred above 
all transient goods and, second, that it is 
iJJ'IDedi.ately within our grasp. The text indicates 
that to prefer to live rightly is a condition for 
baviD;J a good will, which is itself the condition 
for achieving this good so easily. 
De lib arb., I, xiv, 30. 
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so when we say that men are unbaR?Y voluntarily, we cSo not mean 
that they want to be UDba£py, but that their wills are in such a 
state that vnbart>iness must follow even against their will. so it 
is not inconsistent with our previous reasoning that all men wish 
to be happy but cannot be; for all cSo not 1sh to live aright, and 
it is that wish that merits the bappy life. 6 
It is iq;,ossible to ''Prefer [a good will] before all fup.tive and 
transient goods'• and at the same time not wish to live rightly. This is 
obvious. If the condition which is a prerequisite to achieving a good 
will is having a greater desire to live rightly than to attain taiporal 
goods, it seans that this condition is within an individual's power of 
choice. That one cannot attain the good will wit.bout a smpassing 
willing to live rightly does not imply that one has not the power to 
will in this manner. 
The fact that AL¥1UStine bolds that we are justly punished for 
refusing to have such a desire dem:>nstrates that it is within the 
individual's power of choice. This is especially evident when it is 
considered that Al¥;JUStine is arguing directly against Evodius 1 
suggestion that we are not justly held responsible for the failure to 
have this good will. 
Au;1ustine next begins a brief discussion on the natures of both 
the eternal law and the taiporal law. This further develops his notions 
of the essence of evil. He writes that the eternal law, •'bids us turn 
our love away fran temporal things, to cleanse it and turn it towards 
eternal things. 1137 corresponding to the two classes of things, the 
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and pursue eternal things and those who pursue talp)ral things. 1138 
This is a foreshadowiD;J of a theme which will beoane pz:aninent in De 
civitate Dei. Au;Justine aiphasizes that it is the will of each 
individual which determines that which the individual will pursue. 
What each one chooses to pursue and embrace is within the power of 
his will to det.enni ne- Will alone can drive the mind fran its seat 
of authority and fran the right oourse. And it is manifest that 
when anyone uses anything badly it is noj the thiD] but the man 
that uses it badly that is to be blamed. 9 
John Roth expounds on the nature of this choice: 
To turn toward tanporal things (for example, material wealth, 
political power, sensual pleasure) and to make them the focus of 
one's •'ul.timate concern," to use Paul Tillich's tem, is to concern 
oneself primarily with that which is changm;J and perishing, and 
hence of less reality, value, and sustaining power. In these 
circumstances, one may lose birnSAlf to gimensi.ons of reality that 
stand lower on the hierarchical scale. 4 
The essence of evil was initially located as disorder. This is 
further clarified and is now l.mderstood as disorder in the will of man. 
When a man chooses to pursue the tanporal things rather than the 





Now we may give our minds to consider whether doing evil is 
anything else than to neglect eternal things which the mind itself 
perceives and enjoys and loves and cannot lose, and to pursue, as 
if they were great and wonderful., tanporal things which are 
perceived by the body, the lowest part of human nature, and can 
never be possessed with oanplete certainty. For in this class, ft 
seems to me, all evil deeds, that is sins, are to be included. 4 
Ibid., I, xvi, 34. 
Ibid., I, xvi, 34. 
John It. Roth, Problems of the Philosophy of 
Religion (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing co., 
1971), p. 23. 
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In Book I Au;Justine bas axgued that the will of a buman beirg is 
unconstrained by any outside factors. A person freely chooses whether 
to pursue eternal things or to pursue talp)ral things. It is true, 
however, that, as a result of sin, the will is hindered. But this 
hinderance is not a oc:mpulsion to sin. It is possible for a person to 
choose a good will, mt only if the person bas a will to live rightly 
that sw:passes his or her will for tanporal goods. It is this willing 
to live rightly that is hindered by the penalty of sin. The hindrances 
which weigh down the will are the just penalty for sin and they do not 
totally eclipse the will's power to choose. When one chooses to pursue 
temporal things, one's will is evil. This is not that the will in its 
essence is evil mt its choice was disordered and blameworthy. The 
essence of evil is this disorder in the will. In this way, evil finds 
its source in the free mt wrong choice of man. 
Roth outlines two implications that Augustine is seek:m;J by this 
account: 
42 
There are at least two important implications present in this 
response. First, Augustine wants to make clear that there is 
nothing necessary about man's doing evil. The anphasis on free 
choice rules out the view that men bad or have to do evil. Men do 
evil, mt it results fran free choices. Second, the relation 
between human freedan and evil is an important factor in 
Augustine's denial that God causes the evil that men do and 
experience at the bands of each other. The evil men do and 
experience fran each other does have a cause,~ the cause is to 
be fOlmd in the human will rather than in God. 
Nothing is within the power of an individual more than his own 
Roth, Problems of the Philosophy of Religion, p. 24. 
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choice. Therefore, when one chooses evil, one is rightly considered 
blameworthy and one is justly punished. 
The Freedan of the Will in De Vera Religione 
Another work fran this period in which Augustine diSCll.9ses the 
freedan. of the will is Devera religione. This book was written in 
Thagaste in 390 and sent to Rananianus with a caver letter. In this 
letter Au;Ustine introduces it as a work written, 11ooncemiD;J the 
catholic religion.11 43 
Devera religione is an anti-Manichaean work in which Au;Ustine 
emphasizes a positive apologetic for catholic Christianity. He defends 
the use of Authority as a valid means to knawlecge and explains the 
relationship between Authority and Reason. He also defends the 
Incarnation and bow ''Reason sees the created lmiverse as pointing to 
God. 1144 It is in the oontext of these issues that Augustine makes 
several references to the freedan of the will. sane of these reinforce 
themes which emerged in De libero arbitrio Book I. 
The first theme is that of the efficacious nature of each person's 
will. There are two related points in this theme. First, each person 
has the capacity to choose his or her destiny. It is up to the 




Au;Ustine writes that, 110n this floor everyone voll.Dltarily makes 
1:,p., 1.5, 1. 
see J.H.s. Burleigh 1 s Introduction to Devera 
religione (hereafter Dever rel.) in Augustine: 
Earlier Writings p. 224. All references to Dever 
rel. are to Burleigh 1 s translation. 
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himself either com or chaff. 1145 Whether a man is 11corn'' (a good man) 
or "chaff" (one whose life is carnal) is a result of a voluntary 
choice. We shall see that this can be intel:preted in different ways and 
that the different intel:pretations result in different notions of the 
voluntary nature of the free choice. 
The second point follows fran the first. This view of the 
voluntary nature of the individual's choice is essential. in order to 
view a wrong choice, or sin, as blameable. Augustine argues: 
If the defect we call sin overtook a man against his will, 
like a fever, the penalty which follows the sinner and is called 
condemnation would rightly seem to be unjust. But in fact sin is so 
much a voluntary evil that it is not sin at all unless it is 
voluntary •••• lastly if it is not by the exercise of the will that 
we do wrong, no one at all is to be censured or 
wamed •••• therefore, it is by the will that sin is oc:mnitted. And 
since there is no doubt that sins are oc:mnitted, I cannot see that 
it can be doubted that souls have free choice in willing. God 
jud:;Jed that men would serve him better if they served him freely. 
That could ~t be so if they served him by necessity and not by 
free will. 4 
There is no just pmisbment of an act that is not voluntary. In 
order for the person to be responsible, it Dn1St be true that he or she 
has chosen the act. Augustine bolds that this is true even in cases 
where there is strong persuasion. In order to be n:>rally responsible, 
the person Dn1St choose to sin by his or her own will. He writes: 
45 
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Man is said to have been persuaded by the wicked angel, but even so 
it was his will that consented. If he bad consented by necessity, 
De ver rel. , vi, 10. Dr. William Young bas pointed 
out to me that the Latin text is better translated 
as, ''On this floor everyone voluntarily is [rather 
than •'makes himself"] either com or chaff." 
De ver rel., xiv, 27. 
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he would have been held guilty of no sin. 47 
Another thane mentioned in Devera religione which reinforces 
Augustine 1 s view of the freedan of the will is that of the nature of an 
evil choice. o:mtrary to the Manichaean notion that the body itself and 
any bodily pleasure is evil, Augustine asserts that the object of one's 
choice is not evil. This is because there is no evil substance at all. 
Rather, in a case of~ fran the highest good to sane lower good, 
it is the~ itself that is evil. The evil resides in the choice. 
Augustine writes: 
There is therefore a good which it is sin for the rational soul to 
love because it belong-s to a lower order of being. The sin is evil, 
not the substance that is sinfully loved. 48 
All kinds of sin and all heresies have this pattern in ocmnon, 
acoordm;r to Augustine. 
This is the origin of all in;,iety of sinners who have been 
condemned for their sins. Not only do they wish to scrutinize the 
creation contrary to the oc:mnandment of God, and to enjoy it rather 
than God's law and truth- that was the sin of the first man who 
misused his free will- but in their state of condemnation they also 
make this addition to their sin. They not only love but also serve 
the creature rather than the creator, and worship the parts of the 
creation fran the loftiest to the lowliest. 49 
In Devera religione, there is no developed cSoctrine of the 
inheritance of sin and iooral difficulty fran Mam. Altbou:Jh this was 
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devasta~ to the individual's will. There is m:>ral difficulty, and 
the persuasion of satan but there is no oc:q,ulsion. It is still "his 
will that consented. 1150 
Assessment 
In this early period,~ arpbasizes the helpful distinction 
between volrmtary evil and coerced or CC'IJ'{)P..lled vil. It is an 
essential part of his theory, in these works, that only volrmtary evil 
can be considered sin and can be justly punished. 
At first glance, it seems that the fact that the choice is 
volrmtary SUWorts the view that in any given situation, an individual 
oould have chosen to be evil or to not be evil. we observed 51 that 
whether a man is 11corn 11 [a good man] or "chaff" [one whose life is 
carnal] is a result of a volrmtary choice. 
This can, however, be understood in two different ways. The 
0Clllp8.tibilist inteJ:pretation is that, while a person's destiny is a 
result of volrmtary choice, there were antecedent conditions which 
rendered that choice necessary. The choice was both volrmtary and 
necessary. It was volrmtary in that the person is 11corn 11 in accordance 
with his will (not against his will) • The choice was, at the same time, 
necessary because he oould not have willed, given the present 
antecedent conditions, to be "chaff''. 
The incanpatibilist intex:pretation, on the other band, is that the 
choice was volrmtary and not necessary. The particular man who chose to 
50 
51 
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be 11corn 11 bad it in his power to cb:x>se to be 11cbaff" even if every 
antecedent oondi tion was identical in both cases. Both an 
inoarpa+-.ibilist and a oanpatibilist would bold that it is becanM the 
choice is voltmtary that it is one for which the individual. is morally 
accountable. 
To detennine which intm:pretation best fits Augustine's position 
at this point, we must observe that, in a CCllpltibilist scbane, an act 
is free because it is voltmtary. That is, it is free if it is done in 
accordance with the will. A voltmtary act oould be also a necessary 
act. 1'Voltmtary" and ''necessary'' are not contrary to one another and, 
therefore, neither are "free'' and ''neceSSar:Y''• The contrary of a free 
action is one that is not voltmtary, that is, one that is done against 
the will. 
An inoanpatibilist also claims that a free act is one that is 
voltmtary. However, a voltmtary act cannot be, at the same time, a 
necessary act. ''Voltmtary'' and "necessary'' are contraries. unless the 
person oould have chosen either of the two options, the choice is not 
voltmtary; it is necessary. A ''necessary choice'' is no choice at all. 
As we look into the texts, we see that, at this point in his 
develq:ment, Augustine bolds that 11voltmtary'• and ''necessary'' are 
opposed to one another. An act cannot be both. In De vera religione 
AugUstine writes: 
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If the defect we call sin overtook a man against his will, 
like a fever, the penalty which follows the sinner and is called 
condemnation 'WOul.d rightly seem to be tmjust. But in fact sin is so 
much a vol'~.tary evil that it is not sin at all tmless it is · 
voltmtary. 2 
Dever rel., xiv, 27. 
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Man is said to have been persuaded by the wicked ~l, but even so 
it was his will that consented. If he bad ~ted by necessity, 
he would have been held guilty of no sin. 5 
Clearly, in these passages, Au:JUStine is qp>sing a necessary act 
and an act for which a person could be held blameworthy, that is, a 
voll.mtary act. This is a fairly clear statanent of the ino:mp,+:ibilist 
position. In another passage, fran De libero arbitrio, .lUJUStine brilqs 
out that the will bas it in its power to choose either alternative: 
You see, then, I imagine, that it is in the power of our will 
to enjoy or to be without so great and so true a good. For what is 
so cxq,letely within the power of the will as the will itself? 
Whoever has a good will has sanet:ltin;J which is far better than all 
earthly realms and all bodily pleasures. Whoever does not have it, 
lacks that which is n:>re excellent than all the goods whice are not 
in our power, and yet he can have it by willing it s:inply. 4 
He asserts that it is in the power of the will to attain a good 
will or not to attain it. No mention is made of any differences in the 
antecedent conditions that would be necessary before the will oould 
attain the other option.~, in this passage, Au;;JUstine points out 
that all the person needs is to will in order to attain the good will. 
It seems clear that Au:JUStine is saying that a person bas it within his 
or her power to attain either of the two options regardless of any 
oonsideration of antecedent oonditions. In fact, the whole tenor of 
this passage is to emphasize that by merely ''willing it s:inplY'•55 the 
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to an inocq>atibilist notion of the freedan of the will than it is to a 
oanpatibilist view. 
In the period between ~ine's conversion and his ordination to 
the priesthood (386-391) he articulates a theory of the freedan of the 
will of which there are four major m;redients. The first is that each 
lnmm will has the ability to choose either evil or good. A person is 
not OClli)elled to choose one or the other. Two inp)rtant assertions 
follow fran this. These are that it is part of the essential nature of 
sin that it be voll.mtary and that it is possible for a m,:nan will to 
choose a good will and obtain it. The second m;redient is that, as a 
result of sin (and primarily the sin of the individual), the will is 
hindered in its choices. Each soul is weighed down by ignorance and 
inp)tence. These do not raoove the possibility of choosing or obtaining 
the good, b1t sin has brought disorder to the soul in that reason no 
lo~er rules the whole of the person. 
The third m;redient is that evil is located in the disordered 
willing of the soul rather than in the object of the willin]. To love 
and desire sane lower good in the place of the highest good is the 
essence of an evil willi.J:¥;J. Fourth, in these works, there is little 
mention of the grace of God as necessary to enable the will to choose 
rightly. At this point, Au;Justine' s intention is not to establish the 
role of grace at all. :rt seems as though he suggests that the human 
will is able to choose rightly without the special intervention of God. 
41 
As we have seen, Augustine's position during this period can be 
characterized as an inocq,atibilist position. 
There are three aspects of Augustine's view of the freedan of the 
will which will develop tbrol¥Jhout the next six years. The first is his 
view of the ability of the will to choose rightly. The second is his 
position regarding the depth of the effect of Mam's sin on this 
ability. The third is his view of both the necessity and the 
sufficiency of God's grace for right willing. As we shall see, 
A1¥;Justine will bold to the necessity of God's grace as an antecedent 
condition of willing rightly. This is a cc:upltibilist view in that the 
will does not have the power to choose either of the possible options 
without a difference in antecedent conditions. The transition towards 




AUGUSTINE'S VIEW OF THE Fl<EE[Q{ OF THE WILL 
It was in the sprilxJ of 3911 that Augustine traveled to Hippo in 
order to found a monastery. As we have mentioned, 2 Augustine 
Pl,U'POsely avoided those towns in which there was no catholic bishop for 
fear of bei.Jq consecrated bishop by force. Hippo, baviD;J its own 
bishop, Valerius, seemed safe. 
It was Valerius who, in a sern,on, expressed the desperate needs of 
the church so powerfully that the congregation leaped into action. 
seeing Augustine in the back of the church, they forcibly dragged him 
to the front and presented him for ordination. Augustine iJJ'IDM.iately 
burst into tears. Those present supposed it was because he had aspired 
to the higher office of bishop and now bad to settle for bei.Jq a 
priest. Augustine, however, was overwhelmed with lx>th the difficulty of 
the priestly callilq and the raslmess of his fozmer habit of 
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I, whan you see, with God's grace, as your bishop- I came as a 
young man to this city, as many of you knew. I was looking for a 
place to set up a monastery, to live with 'Jlf'J ''brethren". I bad 
given up all hope in this world. What I could have been, I wished 
not to be: nor did I seek to be what I am now. For I chose to be 
humble in the house of 'Jlf'J God rather than to live in the tents of 
sinners. I kept apart fran those wbo loved the world: mt I did not 
think 'Jlf'j8elf equal to those wbo ruled over ocmgregations. At the 
lord's Feast, I did not take up a higher position, mt chose a 
lower and more retiring place: and it pleased the lord to say •'Rise 
up''. 
I feared the office of a bishop to such an extent that, as 
soon as 'Jlf'J reputation came to matter among "servants of God", I 
would not go to any place where I knew there was no bishop. I was 
on 'Jlf'J guard against this: I did what I could to seek salvation in a 
bumble position rather than be in dalqer in high office. But, as I 
said, a slave may not contradict his lord. I came to this city to 
see a friend, whan I thought I might gain for God, that he might 
live with us in the monastery. I felt secure, for the place already 
bad a bishop. I was~- I was made a priest ••• and fran there, 
I became your bishop. 
Almost imned:i.ately, Augustine was thrown into what he describes as 
an "arduous work which now disquiets and crushes 'Jlf'J spirit.11 5 Seeing 
his own inadequacy, he wrote to Valerius pleading for a short period of 
time in which he could concentrate on the study of scripture. He writes 
of the fact that it is bis own spiritual life that needs bealiD;J and 
growth as well as of the need he bas to grasp bow to minister to others 




[W]hen I have learned 'Jlf'J infimity, 'Jlf'J duty is to study with 
diligence all the remedies which the scriptures contain for such a 
case as mine, and to make it 'Jlf'J l::lusiness by prayer and reading to 
secure that 'Jlf'J soul be endued with the heal th and vigor necessary 
for labors so responsible. 6 
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But 11rf difficulty is in the question bow I am to use this truth in 
ministeril¥;J to the salvation of others, seeking what is pro;itable 
not for myself alone, but for many, that they may be saved. 
The intensity of Au;Justine 1 s pleading for this time of preparation 
deloonstrates that be viewed his ordination as a turning point in his 
life calling. Even~ he had been moving closer to an active life 
in the Church, ordination radically changed his focus. No longer did he 
have the freedan. to pursue his dream of a monastery on his own tenns. 
He was now a servant of the people of Hippo. Their needs came first and 
the pastoral ministry occupied the greater part of his attention. 
Au;Justine did not have to give up the monastery, however. Valerius 
graciously and wisely allowed him to develop it. He even gave Ai¥;Justine 
the use of the garden on the church property for a location. Al thc>u]h 
this may awear to have been a concession on Valerius' part, it was to 
his credit that he allowed this and other breaks with tradition. As 
Peter Brown observes, ''He, therefore, ensured both that this 
unprecedented institution [the ioonastery] was officially reo,g:nh:ed in 
Africa, and that a group of extraordinary men- many of them fonner 
Manichees- should settle in his town. 1.S 
There were two other ways in which Valerius broke with the 
accepted practice. The first was that he allowed A1¥;Justine to preach. 
Up to this time, this privilege bad been reserved for the bishops. It 
was in 393, while Ai¥;Justine was still only a priest, that he was 
invited by Aurelius to address the assenhled bishops of Africa on the 
7 
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creed. 9 This message was published as De fide et symbolo. This 
invitation indicates the growiD;J extant of Augustine's influence 
~ the Church in Africa. 
The second break with tradition occurred in 395 when Valerius bad 
Augustine oonsecrated as auxiliary bisbcp. 10 This prevented any other 
town that might be in need of a bishop fran snatching him into service. 
Valerius' action was effective in that Augustine served Hi.we> as nll.ing 
bishop fran Valerius' death in 396 to Augustine's own in 430. 
The catholic Church of Hi.we> in 391 was besieged by heretics and 
schismatics. The heretics were the Manichees. Augustine, already a 
veteran of many disputes with this sect, turned his attack to the 
Manichees at a local level. In 392, he cballen;ied Fortunatus, a 
praninent rnenber, to a public debate. Fortunatus was no match for the 
breadth of knowlea;,e and skill in dialectics which Augustine wielded. 
After two days he was forced to leave town. The text of this debate is 
recorded in Acta ex>ntra Fortunatum Manichaeum. 
The schismatics which threatened the church were the Donatists who 
claimed that they were the true church of Jesus Christ. Acoording to 
this group, the catholic bishops were spiritually descended (thro'l:gh 
oonsecration) fran bishops who had ex>llaborated in the Persecution of 
Diocletian in 303-305. 11 The acts of ex>llaboration deprived the 
bishops of any spiritual authority or power. Those they 11oonsecrated 11, 
acoording to the Donatists, were not true bishops. The Donatist 
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been consecrated by the very bishop who bad been elected to replace the 
collaborators. 
Augustine's many works against the Donatist position do not 
hrmedi.ately concern the freedan of the will. Bawever, it is 1Jll)Ortant 
to keep in mind that, f:can his first days as a priest, Augustine was 
embroiled in two major controversies each of which independently 
threatened the survival of the small catholic ocmmmjty at Hippo. 
The effect of these controversies, his noi:mal pastoral work and 
the establishment of the n:>nastery left very little leisure time for 
literary writing. Although Augustine produced a n:>mJmental mm,hp.r of 
books, it is no exaggeration to say that every one was influenced by 
sane jDIJ!edi.ate controversy. Most of them were written specifically to 
meet sane particular challenge. 
It is in this context that Augustine cx:upleted Books II and III of 
De libero amitrio. He also turned his attention to the writings of st. 
Paul. He began a ccmnentary on 'RaDans, which was soon abandoned and he 
circulated a work consisting of brief ccmnent.s on selected passages in 
that book. This was the Expositio 84 propositionum Epistolae ad 
Rananos. He preached many sennons includin; those that were collected 
into De sennone Danini in n:>nte. 
This period, between ordination and consecration, was one of 
transition for Augustine. He planted himself in Hippo and took on his 
pastoral ministry with great effort. He became a preacher and a leader 
of OClllDOn, uneducated men and Wailell. He also developed into a 
theologian and an exegete as his works became increasiD;Jly focussed on 
the Scripture. All of this had effects on his position regardiJ¥'J the 
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freeda:n of the will. In this chapter I shall draw out the position 
AugUstine held duriJ¥;J this period by examining both Acta contra 
Fortunatum Manichaeum and De libero arbitrio Books II and III. 
The Freedan of the Will in Acta contra 
Fortunatum Manicbaeum 
It was in late Au;JUst or early Sept.anber of 392 that the public 
debate was held between Fortunatus and Au;JUstine.12 The debate lasted 
two days. Althou;h Fortunatus tried to keep the discussion on ground 
which be considered safe, that is, the morals of Manic.haeans, Augustine 
eventually suooeeded in pressin:;J his doctrinal criticiSID.9 of the sect. 
The discussion rmv;Jed aver many issues, including the inviolable nature 
of God, the origin and pw:pose of the soul, and the origin of evil. In 
the context of the origin of evil, the freedan of the will is 
discu.ssed. 
1'gainst Fortunatus' dualism, Au;JUStine contended that •'God made 
all things good, and ordered them well; but He did not make 
sin, ••• 1113 In contrast, Fortunatus declared that evil was "apart fran 
God.1114 By this he meant that evil was a substance distinct fran God. 
Augustine traced the origin of evil, again, to the choice of the will. 
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I ask you, therefore, acoordin;J to that passage which bas been read 
[Ephesians 2:1-18], bow can we have sins if contrary nature oc:m;;,els 
us to do what we do? For · be who is carpel led by nature to do 
anythiD;J, does not sin. But be who sins, sins by free will . 
Wherefore would repentance be enjoined upon us, if we have done 
not.hiD;J evil, l:lut only the race of darkness? Likewise, I ask, to 
whan is forgiveness of sins granted, to us or to the race of 
darkness? If to the race of darkness, their race will also reign 
with Him, receivin;J the forgiveness of sin; l:lut if to us it is 
manifest that we have sinned vollmtarily. For it is the height of 
folly for him to be pardoned who bas done no 9n1. But be bas done 
no evil, who bas done not.hin;J of his awn will. 
In another place, Augustine adds: 
For if anyone, so to speak, should be :bound by saneone in his other 
JIIE'fflbP_rs, and with his band sanet.hin;J false should be written 
without his awn will, I ask whether if this were laid open before a 
juci;Je, be could condemn this one for the crime of falsehood. 
Wherefore, if it is manifest that there is no sin where there is 
not free exercise of the will, I wish to bear what evil the soul 
which you call either part, or power, or word, or sanet.hin;J else, 
of God, bas done, that it should be pmished by God, or ~t of 
sin, or merit forgiveness, since it bas in no way sinned? 
In response to Augustine's discussion of the freedan of the will, 
Fortunatus ~ up that, in human experience, cboosilxJ does not seem 
to be as free as Au;Justine iq,lies. In addition, be~ in certain 
New Testament Scriptures which seem to auwort that the individual is 
powerless in the struggle against sin. He argues: 
15 
16 
Therefore it is evident fran these thiJxJs that the good soul seems 
to sin not vollmtarily, l:lut by the doilxJ of that which is not 
subject to the law of God. For it likewise follows that "the flesh 
lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh; so 
that ye may not do the thiJxJs that ye will." 1'gain: "I see another 
law in 'lfrJ JDESDbP'C'S, warring against the law of 'lfrJ mind and leading 
me captive in the law of sin and of death. Therefore I mn a 
miserable man: who shall deliver me fran the body of this death, 




•~ wban the world bas been crucified to me and I to the 
world?" 7 
It awears, reasons Fortunatus, that the will is not free in the 
sense that Augustine bas been asserting. Both hlDan experience and the 
New Testament shaw that cboosilq rightly is difficult, if it is 
possible at all. Augustine responds by discussilq the i-ole of habit 




I say that there was free exercise of will in that man who was 
first foxmed. He was so made that absolutely nothing could resist 
bis will, if he had willed to keep the precepts of God. But after 
he vollllltarily sinned, we who have descended fnm bis stock were 
pllJD:1ed into necessity. But each one of us can find out by a little 
consideration that what I say is true. For today in our actions 
before we are implicated by an'/ habit, we have free cboice of doing 
anything or not doilq it. But when by that liberty we have done 
sanething and the pernicious sweetness and pleasure of that deed 
bas taken hold upon the mind, by its own habit the mind is so 
implicated that af~ it cannot conquer what by sinning it bas 
fashioned for itself. 
Prendiville explains this necessity: 
Adam, he explains, possessed free will. He was so made that if 
he willed to observe God's cx:mnands, nothing could resist bis will. 
But after he sinned (and that by an act of bis free will), we, bis 
descendants, were thrown into a certain 11necessity. 11 We can verify 
this ''necessity" for ourselves. Today, before we acquire a habit, 
we have the free choice to do a certain action or not. When, 
however, we have done sanething freely, and the pernicious 
sweetness and pleasure of the action bas gripped our soul, then it 
beco:nes so involved in its habit, that later it cannot rreroane 
what it made for itself by sinning in the first place. 1 
Ibid., 21. 
Ibid., 22. 
John G. Prendiville, 1"1'he Developnent of the Idea 
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The ''necessity" into which we are thrown in virtue of being .Mam 1 s 
descendants is not that of being OClll')letely and inherently incapable of 
cboosin; rightly or WJ:"OD;Jly. It is a necessity the experience of which 
each person bring-s upon biJDSAlf or herself. Before ''we are in;>licatecf 
in any habit" there is the freedan of indifference in doin; or in 
refraining fran doin; any given action. once an option is chosen, there 
is a resultin; effect of the choice in the mind. In sane cases, this is 
a deep attraction; what AD;Ustine called a •tpern:i.cious sweetness and 
pleasure." once it is experienced, the mind is attracted and it foms 
the habit of choosi.D;J the option which bring-s this pleasure. The effect 
of this habit is a stron; inclination to choose in one way rather than 
another. It is this inclination that AL¥1tJStine calls a •tnecessi ty." It 
is important to keep in mind that what is inherited as a result of 
Adam's sin is the disposition to foi:m these habits of the soul and to 
be bound by them. The necessity itself is not inherited. 
In response to Fortunatus 1 use of the passage, •"l'he mind of the 
flesh is hostile to God; is not subject to the law of God, neither 
indeed can be,,-2° Augustine further describes the effect of habit on 
the will 1 s capacity to choose: 
20 
And this is what wars against the soul, habit fo:cmed in the flesh. 
This is indeed the mind of the flesh, which, as l<>n:J as it cannot 
thus be subject to the law of God, so lon; is it the mind of the 
flesh; but when the soul bas been illuninated it ceases to be the 
mind of the flesh. For thus it is said the mind of the flesh cannot 
be subject to the law of God, just as if it were said, that snow 
cannot be wai:m. For as lon; as it is snow, it can in no way be 
wai:m. But as the snow is melted by beat, so that it may beoaDe 
wai:m, so the mind of the flesh, that is, habit fo:cmed with the 
flesh, when our mind bas beoane illuninated, that is, when God bas 
subjected for Himself the whole man to the choice of the divine 
C Fort. , 21 quotin:J Ranans 8: 7. 
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law, instead of the evil habit of the soul, makes a good habit • 
.k,oordi.n:Jly it is most truly said by the IDrd of the two trees, the 
one good and the other evil, which you have called to mind, that 
they have their own fruits; that is, neither can the good tree 
yield evil fruit, nor the evil tree good fruit, but so lcm;J as it 
is evil. Let us take two men, a good and a bad. As lcm;r as be is 
good, be cannot yield evil fruit; as lcm;J as be is bad be cannot 
yield good fruit. But that you may Jcnow that these two trees are so 
placed by the IDrd, that free choice may be there signified, that 
these two trees are not natures but our wills, He Bi rnself says in 
the gospel: •'Either make the tree good or make the tree evil. 11 Who 
is it that can make nature? If therefore we are 0C111MDded to 1f81t8 a 
tree either good or evil, it is ours to choose what we will. 2 
As lcm;r as the mind ranainq the mind of the flesh, ~ 
reasons, it cannot be subject to God. This is not statin;J, as 
Fortunatus wished to inply, that the mind of the flesh can never be 
free to choose. Rather it is only as lcm;J as the mind TSDains of the 
flesh that it is lx>1md by necessity. once the soul bas been 
illuminated, it is no lon:ier the mind of the flesh. It is freed fran 
the habits of evil and beccmes subject to good habit. 
Au;JUstine clarifies the distinction between his view and that of 
Fortunatus by e:xplai.ni.n:J the two trees. That they are wills and not 
natures can be seen because of the 0C'JJINU)d to make them either good or 
evil. It is not within a person, s power to change or to make his or her 
own nature. Therefore, the trees must represent wills. Because they are 
wills, it is clear that the source of evil fruit is the will and not 
the nature. This directly challe!Y:Jes Fortunatus 1 notion that the evil 
fruit is a necessary result of the dark nature within humans which 
derived fran the evil principle. 
Prendiville suomarizes the role of habit in Au;)Ustine 1 s tllowJht at 
this time: 
21 Ibid., 22. 
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Thus by 394 one finds Au;Justine in kind of a half-way position 
between the t.ho\¥;Jht of the De Vera Religione and the confessions. 
The ideas that be is a:iphasizing are these: Man's will is free; any 
necessity toward evil that be experiences is the result of J:iad 
habits which be freely develops; this developnent is possible 
because be is a oanplex bein;J, made up of bocly and soul; be can rid 
himself of these habits with God's 1,lP and his own efforts, and 
thus attain peace even in this life. 2 
The Freedan of the Will in De Libero 
Arbitrio Books II & III 
De Libero Arbitrio Book II 
Book II of De libero arbitrio centers on the question of whether 
or not God should have given free will to man. Au;Justine's strategy of 
Book II is, first, to denonstrate that God does exist and that this can 
be known by reason and not just by faith. Beoondly, be will argue that 
all good tlrln;Js that exist are fran God. Third, be reasons that free 
will is itself a good thin;J. If it is a good thin;J, and all good tlrln;Js 
cane fran God, then we know that it is fran God and that it is right 
that He gave it to us. Therefore God is not to be blamed for evil 
because it was right that be should give us free will even though we 
use it to do evil. 
Au;Justine's argunents for the existence of God are interestin] but 
do not, in themselves, concern us in this study. It is enog;Jh to 
observe that be is confident, both in virtue of his faith and in virtue 
22 John G. Prendiville, ''The Developnent of the Idea of 
Habit in the Tlloa;ht of saint Au;Justine," p. 74. 
53 
of his reason, that God does exist. His concern is, given that God 
exists, bow we can answer the question of the origin and nature of evil 
in such a way that does not include making God morally blameworthy for 
the evil in the world. Be is attanpting to discover notions of freedan, 
bl.amewortb;ness, evil and God's sovereignty which render his theistic 
view consistent. QlCe Au;lUstine has dE1DOnstrated the existence of God 
(at least to his own and EYodius' satisfaction), he moves on to the 
next step, that of dEIDOnstrating that all good things cane fran God. 
Au;ustine claims that in the metaphysical structure of each 
individual thing is an essential dependence upon God for existence. All 
things, in so far as they exist, are fran God. If all things are fran 
God, certainly all good things, in so far as they exist, also are fran 
God. ~ine writes, ''There can be no good things, whether great or 
small, which do not owe their existence to God.1123 Although all 
things owe their existence to God, as we have seen, evil is not fran 
God. By understanding that evil is not a positive thing and that it has 
no form, ~ine can coherently bold that every existing thing 
receives its form fran God and is good. It can be said that God created 
everything but that Be did not create evil because evil is not a thing. 
QlCe it is established that God does exist and that Be made every 
thing that is good, it must next be dEIDOnstrated that free will is to 
be considered a good thing. If free will can be shown to be a good 
thing, it can then be known that it has been given by God and that 
there is no reason to regret its having been given. 
~tine pursues two lines of thought in order to establish that 
23 De lib arb., II, xvii, 46. 
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free will is indeed a good thing. First, be shows that the fact that 
free will can be used for evil does not preclude its being good in 
itself. ~ appeals to the lunan band which no one considers an 
evil thing in itself wen though it is possible, and wen ocmnon, for · 
one to use one's band to do evil. If 8Y'8D a physical abject, like the 
hand, can be good in spite of its potential use for evil, bow much more 
can an incorporeal thing such as free will be considered good? 
The second line of reasoning ~ presents is tbat there are 
numerous things (such as the hair on one's bead) which are considered 
good although they are not necessary in order for one to live a 
virtuous life. Since free will is necessary for a virtuous life, it 
must be considered a good thing. 
What perversity it is to m:m,bAr our hairs moong the good things 
thou]h they are small and utterly contemptible, and to attribute 
their creation to God, the creator of all good things because all 
good things, the greatest and the least, cane fran him fran whcm is 
all good; and yet to hesitate to ascribe free will to him, seei.D;J 
that wi tbout it no one can live aright even on the testimony of 
those who live evil lives. 2 
Au:;1\lStine recognizes that there is a distinction between goods. 
There are goods, such as justice, which are called great goods. These 
can never be used for evil. Free will belOD3S to the class of goods 
called int;e:nnet'liate goods. These can be used either for good or for 
evil but they are good in themselves. 
To use an inte:nuettiate good for evil is not to choose sane evil 
thing. It is, as we have seen, an evil cboosin;J. It is to turn away 
fran the highest good and to turn to a lower good. It is the turning 
24 Ibid., II, xviii, 49. 
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itself which is evil, not the lower good to which the will is turned. 
Nor is it the capac:ity to turn that is itself evil. 
so it baA;>ens that the good things SOl.¥Jht by sinners cannot in any 
way be bad, nor can free will be bad, for we found that it was to 
be mmibered im:,ng the intennediate goods. What is bad is its 
turning way fran the unchangeable good and its turning to 
changeable~- That "aversion'' and 1'conversion' 1 is voluntary and 
not ex>eroed. 
If it is this turnm;J of the will that is evil, the next question 
is what the cause of this turning oould be. ~ briefly touches 
upon this as a transition to Book III: 
But perhaps you are going to ask what is the cause of the 
movement of the will when it turns fran the imnutable to the 
mutable good. That movement is certainly evil, although free will 
DDJSt be mmibered among good things since without it no one can live 
aright. We cannot doubt that that movement of the will, that 
turning way fran the IDrd. God, is sin; but surely we cannot say 
that God is the author of sin? God, then, will not be the cause of 
that movement; but what will be its cause? If you ask this, and I 
answer that I do not know, prly you will be saddened, And yet 
that would be a true answer. 6 
~ pleads ignorance oonoerning the cause of the actual 
turning of the will. Al¥;JUstine is not throwiiq the question into the 
realm of mystery to avoid wrestling with it. Maker points out two 
reasons ''Why Al.r;UStine's position ought not to be looked at as an 
abdication of the philosophical demand for intelligil:>ility. 027 one 
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the area of the problElll of evil. He is not just qui ttiD;J. 
The other reason is that the nature of the will itself is such 
that this question is unanswerable. •'This is the fact that we 
experience the will as an initiating or 1DSetenni:ned causal force, as 
sanething which in and of itself causes things to baA?ft'\ which would 
otherwise not baA?ffl'. 1128 It seems, for his aooount, that there can be 
no cause outside of the choosing agent birnSAlf. 
All good is fran God. Hence there is no natural existence which is 
not fran God. Now that m::wement of "aversion," which we admit is 
sin, is a defective m::wement; and all defect canes fran nothing. 
Observe where it belongs and you will have no doubt that it does 
not belong to God. Because that defective m::wement is voluntary, it 
is placed within our power. If you fear it, all you have to do is 
simply not to will it. If you do not will it, it will not 
'st 29 exi • 
Au;Justine closes Book II by setting up the question concerning the 
cause of the will'S turning. This leads directly into the canplicated 
question of the canpatibility of divine foreknowleciJe and this concept 
of rnnnan free&:m. This he tac:kles in Book III. 
De Lil:>ero Amitrio Book III 
Book III opens with a discussion of the relationship between 
divine foreknowl~e and human.freedcm. Evodius is still pressin;J bis 
question concerning the origin of the will' s turning, "[W] henc:e arises 
the m::wement by which the will itself turns fran the ~eable good, 
28 
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which is the oarmon property of all, to its own interests ••• 1130 This 
is illp>rtant to him because this question captures the issues regarding 
where the blame lies for the sinful will and all of the evil which 
resulted. He writes, "[I]f free will is so given that it has that 
m::wement by nature, it turns of necessity to mutable goods; and no 
blame attaches where nature and necessity prevail. 1131 In other words, 
if anything, such as God's foreknowlecge which Evodius bring-sup 
presently, is such that the m::wement of the will fran the ilrmutal:>le to 
the mutable good is necessary (in just such a way that the soul cannot 
avoid this m::wement), the person cannot be held responsible. 
The type of freedan that is dee:ned necessary for moral 
culpability, here as in the writin;s surveyed in Chapter II, is an 
ll'OCIJ'{)atibilist view. As I have indicated, I take this to mean that for 
a person to be sufficiently free regarding a choice, he must be 
actually able to choose either of the alternatives even if every other 
antecedent oondi tion remained the same. Au;Justine writes: 
Moreover, unless the m::wement of the will towards this or that 
object is voll.mtary and within our power, a man would not be 
praiseworthy when he turns to the higher objects nor blamewon11Y' 
when he turns to lower objects, using his will like a hinge. 2 
The reference to a hinge in this passage is a canparlson which 
highlights this feature of the will. Just as one can turn a hinge 
either way, one can turn one's will either towards the highest good or 
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''do otherwise.•• 
Evodi.us turns to the problan of divine foreknowledge: 
I have a deep desire to know bow it can be that God knows all 
things beforehand and that, nevertheless, we do not sin by 
necessity •••• since God foreknew that man woul.d sin, that which God 
foreknew must necessarily cane to pass. Haw then is ~ will free 
when there is ~tly this unavoidable necessity? 
Au;1UStine articulates the problan as follows: 
Your trouble is this. You wonder bow it can be that these two 
propositions are not contradictory and inc:arpa+-.ible, namely that 
God has foreknowledge of all future events, and that we sin 
voll.mtarily and not by necessity. For if, you say, God foreknows 
that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But if there is 
necessity there is no voll.mtary choice in sjnnjng, but rather fixed 
and unavoidable necessity. You are afraid that by that reasoning 
the conclusion may be reached either that God's foreknowledge of 
all future events must be impiously denied, or, if that cannot~ 
denied, that sin is cxmnitted not voll.mtarily but by necessity. 
Au:1UStine takes three approaches to this question. The first two 
highlight undesirable consequences which follow if God's foreknowledge 
did preclude freedan of the will. The third is an investigation into 
the necessity that attaches to knowledge. 
Au:1UStine's first approach in answeriD:J this problem is to point 
out that if God's foreknowledge rules out future mwan freedan, it also 
rules out God's own freedan. It is assumed that God is free in any and 
all of His actions. 
33 
34 
Don't you see that you will have to be careful lest saneone say to 
you that, if all things of which God has foreknowledge are done by 
necessity and not voll.mtarily, bis own future acts will be done not 
Ibid., III, ii, 4. 
Ibid., III, iii, 6. 
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voluntarily but by necessity. 35 
Au;Justine's second approach is to show that, if foreknowledge 
precluded freedan, it would be possible for God to make Evodius happy , 
against his will. If, for instance, it is true that in exactly one 
year, Evodius will be happy, then God knows that this is true. If God's 
foreknowledge creates necessity, then Evodius will be happy by 
necessity. If Evodius is happy (in one year) by necessity and not 
voluntarily, then it is possible that he is made happy again.c;t:. his 
will. Au;Justine, here, is~ use of the fact that, in his view, to 
say that sanethi.DJ baWened ''by necessity'' is equivalent to sayi.D;J that 
it occurred ''not voluntarily." 
Acoording to Evodius, this is impossible. Augustine ooncludes 
that, ''Therefore thou;Jh God knows how we are goi.D;J to will in the 
future, it is not proved that we do not voluntarily will anythiD;J. 1136 




When you said that you did not make yourself happy, you said it as 
if I bad denied it. What I say is that when you beoane happy in the 
future it will not take place against your will but in aooordance 
with your willi.D;J. Therefore, though God has foreknowledge of your 
happiness in the future, and though nothin;J can ba£{)81' otherwise 
than as He has foreknown it (for that would mean that there is no 
foreknowledge) we are not thereby oaJP!lled to think that you will 
not be happy voluntarily. That would be absurd and far fran true. 
God's foreknowledge, which is even today quite certain that you are 
to be happy at a future date, does not rob you of your will to 
happiness when you actually attain happiness. Similarly if ever in 
the future you have a culpable will, it ~¼l be none the less your 
will because God has foreknowledge of it. 
lbid. 
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God foreknows both the voluntary willin;J and the result of that 
williD;J. In this way, His foreknowledge, rather than eliminating br1nan 
freedan, actually preserves and protects it. 
God has foreknowledge of our will, so that of which he bas 
foreknowledge must cane to pass. In other words, we shall exercise 
our wills in the future because he has foreknowledge that we shall 
do so; and there can be no will or voluntary action 1.Ulless it be in 
our power. Hence God has also foreknowledge of our power to will. 
My power is not taken fran me by God's foreknowledge. Indeed I 
shall be more certainly in possession of 1lrJ power because he whose 
foreknowledge is never mistaken, foreknows that I shall have the 
power.38 
As craig observes: 
Hence, foreknowledge, far fran being i.ncaJpat.il>le with free 
will, actually serves to guarantee it. For since God foreknows our 
future acts of will, these will cane to pass as He foreknows than. 
He foreknows that these acts will be acts of our will and therefore 
within our power •••• [Al.¥;1Ustine] argues that even if there is in 
God's mind a definite pattern of causation which he foreknows, it 
does not follow that no roan is left for the free choice of our 
will. For our wills are included in that very pattern of causes 
foreknown by God, since the wills of men are included among the 
causes of men's deeds. How then can the order of causes which is 
fixed in God's foreknowledge deprive us of the use of our will when 
our wills are an :iq;>orta.nt part of the causal series itself? OJr 
acts ii will have just as much power as God foresaw than to 
have. 
The third approach Al.¥;1Ustine makes to the foreknowledge/free will 
issue is an analysis of the necessity that attaches to foreknowledge. 
lO;JUStine asks Evodius whether bis view that foreknowledge is 
foreknowledge that is bein;J considered or is it c!'ue to the nature of 
38 
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foreknowledge in general. Altho\.¥J}l Evodius clams that it is divine 
foreknowledge that is the problem, A1¥;)ustine demonstrates that any sort 
of foreknowledge will brinI the problem Evodius sees. 
If you knew in advance that such and such a man would sin, there 
would be no necessity for him to sin. [Evodius replies]-xnc3eed 
there would, for I should have no real foreknowledge unless I knew 
for certain what was goinI to ba["1?8!\. [A1¥;)ustine's conclusion]-SO 
it is foreknowledge generally and not God's foreknowledge specially 
that causes the events foreknown to ba[t)Em by necessity? There 
would be no such th.iD] as foreknowledge unless there was certain 
foreknowledge. 40 
Au;Justine's point is that the problem Evodius bas raised is not 
lmique to divine foreknowledge. It is true of any possible 
foreknowledge. Implied in this is the view that knowledge entails true 
belief. If what one claims to know is false, one does not have 
knowledge. Qlly what is true can be known. Therefore, if one knows 'P', 
'P' must be true. Hence, if one foreknows that 'x' will oocur, it is 
certain that 'X' will occur. If anyone, not just God, bas foreknowledge 
that a man will sin, it is certain that the man will sin. Au;Justine 
describes this case. 
40 
41 
unless I am mistaken, you would not directly oanpel the man to sin, 
thol.gh you knew beforehand that he was goinI to sin. Nor does your 
prescience itself oanpel him to sin even thol.gh he was certainly 
goinI to sin, as we must assume if you have real prescience. So 
there is no contradiction here. Simply you know beforehand what 
another is goinI to do with his own will. Similarly God oanpels no 
man to sin, ~h he sees beforehand those who are goinI to sin by 
their own will. 4 
De lib arb., III, iv, 10. 
Ibid. 
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If it is foreknowleci;Je s:i.q,ly that seans to preclucle free will, 
this is because any foreknowldJ& of an avant carries with it the 
oertai.nty that the avant will take place. 'l'be necessity attaches to the 
foreknawleci;Je as a type of knowleci;Je. It does not attach to the 
foreknawleci;Je because of the divine nature of the knowlect;Je. 
Foreknawleci;Je of an action, whether by God or any other k:nowi.iq bein;J, 
does not OCJTt>P..l the action. The certainty of knowlecge does not entail 
the necessity of the object of knowldJ&. 
This distinction bas cane to be known as the distinction between 
the necessity of the oonsequence and the necessity of the oonsequent. 
As Konyndyk explains: 
Basic:ally,the distinction is between two different ways of 
takin:;J the soope of necessity in a conditional. The oocurrence of 
the word ''necessarily" in a conditional may signal the necessity of 
the oonnection between the antecedent and the consequent of that 
conditional, that is to say, the necessity of the oonseguence. or 
1'nec:essaril'Y'' may indicate the necessity of the oonseguent of the 
oonditional. 42 
Usin;J 'N' as 'necessarily', we can represent this distinction as: 
N(if p, then q) = the necessity of the oonseguence. 
(if p, then Nq) = the necessity of the oonseguent. 
A proper understanding of forekncwlecge would reveal that the 
necessity of the oonsequenoe awlies mt the necessity of the 
42 Kenneth Konyndyk, Introducto:cy Modal Ipgic (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), 
p. 21. 
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oonsequent does not. 0nly if, however, the necessity of the consequent 
applied, would the event itself be necessary and the free&ID. of 
indifference ooncernilq the event be eliminated. In this respect, 
~ points out, foreknawlEd;Je is similar to IDEIIK>ry knowledge. 
JUst as you awly no ocapllsion to past events by baviIXJ them 
in your JDEm:>ry, so God by his foreknowledge does not use OCllpl].sion 
in the case of future events. Just as you renenbP:r your past 
actions, tllou;Jb all that you .ranen,J,P..r were not actions of your own, 
so God bas foreknowledge of all f's own actions, but is not the 
agent of all that be foreknows. 4 
Au:;1UStine concludes that God is not the cause of the movement of 
the will of a bl.mm being even t.bal.¥pl God foreknows that the person's 
will will so move. The person birnself is the agent and cause of his own 
will's turning. In this way, God is not to be blamed for the evil will. 
Each person is culpable for his or her own turning of will fran the 
highest good to sane lesser goods. 
It is important to observe what it is that Al.l:;1UStine is attem;>ting 
to demonstrate. He is not arguing for a reconciliation of divine 
foreknowledge and human freedan in which divine foreknowledge prodllCeS 
a causal necessity and yet the will is still free. Rather, he is 
arguing that divine foreknowledge, even tllou;Jb it is never mistaken, 
does not cause the will to choose one way or another. The will is free 
fran causal necessity in the sense that Craig observes: "Rather, we 
bave seen that in books one, two, and three Au:;1UStine aweared to 
affi.m a view of the will which entailed the liberty of 
43 De lib arb., III, iv, 11. 
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indifference. 1144 
Augustine, in a brief section, next m:gues fran the notion of 
obligation to the fact of lnmm freedan. Be writes, ''No man is guilty 
because he bas not received this or that power. But because he does not 
do as he ou;ht he is justly held guilty. <l:>ligation arises if he bas 
received free will and sufficient power. 1145 since obligation seems to 
be a fact of mral experience, it is reasonable to believe that people 
have been given free will and sufficient power to do what is right. 
Guilt canes to the individual only if the individual fails to choose 
that which the individual could choose. There is no real guilt in the 
absence of real freedan of will. 
Another way to approach this is to suppose that there were no free 
will. Au;JUstine writes, 11If '~htness' depends upon what bas been 
given, and man bas been made that be sins by necessity, then he ought 
to sin. 1146 If, then, man is not sufficiently free to choose good over 
evil, man would be right to sin. All sin would cane fran his nature. 
Perhaps God could be blamed t:ut not man because man 1'ou;ht" to sin. 
Au;JUstine is aweaJ.inI to an intuition that it seems unacceptable to 
say that one ou;ht to sin. If one rejects that one ou;ht to sin, 
Augustine wants to say that one must acknowleck;Je that sin is by choice. 
Evodius awears again in the dialogue at this point and moves the 
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But I should like to know, if possible, why those beings do not sin 
wban God knew beforehand would not sin, and why those others do sin 
wban be foresaw would sin. I do not now think that God's 
foreknawle&Je OC'IJl)Als the one to sin and the other not to sin. But 
if there were no cause rational creatures would not be divided into 
classes as they are: those who never sin, those who oontirniaJ ly 
sin, and the int:e:nnetti.ary class of those who sanetimes sin and 
sanetimes are turned towards well-doing. What is the reason for 
this division? I do not want you to reply that it is the will that 
does it. What I want to know is what cause lies behind willing? 47 
It may be the case, Augustine points out, that Evodius is asking 
for an infinite rEqress of causes. Using the idea ~ested by the 
Scriptural phrase, ''Avarice is the root of all evilS'' (I Tim 6:10) 
Augustine presses Evodius 1 question. 
But you ask what is the cause of this root. How then will it be the 
root of all evils? If it bas a cause, that cause will be the root 
of evil. And if you find a cause, as I said, you will ask for a 
cause of that cause, and there will be no limit to your 
· · 48 inquiry. 
But what cause of willing can there be prior to willirq? 
Either it is a will, in which case we have not got beyond the root 
of evil will. or it is not a will, and in that case there is no sin 
in it. Either, then, will itself is the first cause of sin, or the 
first cause is without sin. 49 
Augustine is here arguinJ that the evil will is its own cause. 
There is no prior cause which makes the will choose evil. If ~ 
forces the will to choose sin, it is not a vollmtary choice and, 
therefore, it is not sin. This view of the cause of the evil will is a 
case of agent causation. The person biJDsP.lf is an uncaused cause with 
respect to the choice. He is not CC'llpl'-lled either way and be beo:JDes 
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Robert Brown argues at length that this first evil will must be 
iD<Xl"{)~ible: 
Here he asserts that an evil will bas no efficient cause, or no 
11essential 11 cause. The evil will stands as efficient cause of an 
evil deed, but this will itself bas no efficient cause. If the 
first instance of evil willing did have an efficient cause, that 
cause could only be the nature of the willing being itself. 
(Excluded fran the outset are the other two possibilities: it has a 
prior evil will as its cause; G:,c, biJD!3Al.f causes the evil will.) If 
the first being that willed evil bad a created nature that was 
good, its willing evil is an ~licable fact which cannot be 
acoomited for by its nature. 5 
Brown, s main concern in his paper is with passages in which 
Au;JUStine tries to make this first evil will explicable. According to 
Brown, Au;JUStine1 s admission of ignorance in this passage is one of his 
•'better nanents 11• 51 Brown himself will not ultimately accept agent 
causation. Rather, he looks either to a necessary fall, as in Irenaeus, 
or a 1'transcenden+-.al fall", as in :Kant. Au;JUStine, however, is here 
asserting that the first evil will is inoarprehensible simply because 
the human soul is the agent and cause of the will. There is no further 
explanation. 52 
Au;JUStine then discusses sane scriptural passages which seem to 
indicate that it is outside the soope of a human being's power to 
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of man. 
If this were a description of man's nature and not of the penalty 
of sin, his situation W0Uld not be sinful. If man has not departed 
f:ran the natural state in which he was created, and which could not 
be made better, he is doing what he cu;Jht even if he does evil. But 
DOW man might be good if he were different. Because be is what he 
DOW is, he is not good, nor is it in his power to becxlDe good, 
either bec,anse he does not see what he cu;Jbt to be, or, seeinJ it, 
bas not the power to be ~j he sees he Ol.l;1ht to be. Wbo can doubt 
that his is a penal state? 
The penal state is that man bas lost that of which he was 
miwilling to make good use. "In fact there are for every sinful soul 
these two penal conditions, ignorance and difficulty. 1154 Each sinful 
man bas lost the ability to know what is right, 0C1Dpletely, and he bas 
also lost the ability to perfom that which is right, 0C1Dplete1y, even 
if he should choose to try to perfom it. Of this ignorance and 
difficulty~ writes, "these do not bel.01¥J to the nature of man 
as he was created. They are the penalty of man as oondemned. When we 
speak of the freedan of the will to do right, we are speaking of the 
freedan wherein man was createc1.n 55 
Au3UStine, in this discussion of the difficulty of right choosing, 
does not appeal to habit, as he did in Acta contra Fortunatum 
Manichaeum. Instead he implies that the effects of Mam 1 s sin go deeper 
than merely an inherited disposition to fom habits of the soul which 
include strong inclinations to choose one way rather than another. Man, 
after sin, is no l01¥Jer in his natural state. Of man AD;1UStine writes 
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words, to sane degree, man's original nature bas been lost because of 
.Mam's sin. 
originally, .Mam was free to choose to live rightly or to live 
wrongly. There was no ocmpul.sion either way. CllC8 be sinned, .Mam lost 
the ability to live rightly in his own~- His original nature 
was corrupted and be lacked the disoerment to understand what was 
right as well as the power to do what small part of the right be oauld 
recognize. 
This is a stronger view of the hinderance of the will which 
results fran sin than that which we observed in De libero arbitrio Book 
I. This is still not Au;Ustine's most developed position on this. Bare, 
be insists that guilt is not inherited as a result of Mam's sin. He 
also bolds that it is still within the power of the individual to turn 
to God in order to receive divine aid to overoane this penalty of sin. 
The turning to God is possible without the prior intervention of His 
grace. As we shall see in the next chapter, after his beooming bishop, 
Au;Ustine ~ed on both of these points. Guilt was seen as inherited 
and even the turning to God to receive help was impossible without 
God's prior grace. 
Au;Ustine, once be distinguished between the freedan with which 
ln;a:oanity was created fran the freedan with which it now finds itself, 
seeks to defend the doctrine of the inherited penalty of sin. sane, be 
admits, object to this. 
They say: :tf .Mam and Eve sinned, what have we miserable creatures 
done to deserve to be born in the darlmess of ignorance and in the 
toils of difficulty, that, in the first plaoe, we should err not 
~ what we ou:Jht to do, and, in the second plaoe, when the 
precepts of justice begin to be q>ened out to us, we should wish to 
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obey ~fl but by sane necessity of carnal lust should not bave the 
power? 
Augustine's first response is a rather abusive ad bani.nan, ''Keep 
quiet and stop mumur~ against God.1157 Secondly, and 100re to the 
point, he a[t)8a.ls to the fact that each person sins even in relation to 
the capacity with which he or she was born. 
You are not held guilty because you are ignorant in spite of 
yourself, but because you neglect to seek the knowledge you do not 
possess. You are not held guilty because you do not use your 
wounded membe,:-s but because you despise hlm who is will~ to heal 
them. These are your own personal sins. 58 
It is not the sin which one involuntarily inherits that is the 
source of guilt and punisllnent, but, Augustine is arguing, it is the 
personal sin of the individual which merits guilt and pmisbnent. These 
personal sins are voluntary and not due to Mam at all. Even if one's 
capacity to understand or choose right is inpaired by the inherited 
penal effects of Mam's sin, one still voluntarily sins when one 
chooses to ignore the capacity one bas :been given and deliberately 
lives below one's possibilities. 
Even tllc>u;Jh lnnan freedan is, to sane degree, lost in the Fall, it 
is still true, acoo~ to AugUstine, that Mam's ciescend,mts bave the 
ability to turn and receive divine aid for overcxning this loss. This 
is a foreshadowing of the great anpbasis which will be placed on the 









But if any of Maln's race should be willing to turn to God, and so 
overoane the punisllnent which had been merited by the original 
turniD;J away fran God, it was fitting not only that he should not 
be hindered but that he should also receive divine aid. In this way 
also the creator showed bow easily man might have retained, if he 
had so willed, the nature with which he was created, bec:a~ his 
offspring had power to tr.msamd that in which he was born. 9 
It is important to observe that in this passage, ~ine :inplies 
that the divine aid canes after a person is willing to turn to God. 
While it is true that we need divine aid to overoane that pmjsbnent of 
ignorance and difficulty, it seems that this divine aid canes to those 
who are willing to turn to God. AugUstine does not say, at this point, 
that God gives aid in order to enable sane to be willirq to turn to 
God. Rather, beirq or beoaning willing to turn, seems to be prior to 
God's intervention. 
Even thou;lh man inherits ignorance and difficulty as a result of 
.Mani's sin, man bas been given great advantages, even after the fall. 
It is possible for the individual soul to advance "towards knowledge 
and trarquility 1.mtil it reaches the perfection of the happy life. 1160 
Since this advance is possible, after the fall, it is just to bold as 
culpable those who choose not to advance. 
If by its own will it neglects to advance by means of good studies 
and piety- for the capacity to do so is not denied to it- it justly 
falls into a still graver state of ignorance and SUUNle, which is 
now penal, and is ranked aioong inferior creatures acoording to the 
awropriate and fitting government of the lmiverse. Natural 
ignorance and natural impotence are not reckoned to the soul as 
guilt. The guilt arises because it does not eagerly pursue 
-------59 
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knowledge, and does not fil:ve adequate attention to acquiring 
facility in doing right. 1 
It is the individual's own unwillmJDeSS to use the abilities 
which he bas been given and to purposefully grow towards wjsdan that 
brings guilt. ~, AugUstine is denying that the guilt of Mam's sin 
is inherited. Qlly the penalty is passed on. 
Assessment 
~t this period, Au;;JUStine aclmowledges, m:>re explicitly 
than previously, the reality of moral 8tru:1gle. concerns about the 
nature of this 8tru:1gle and its relevance to the freedan of the will 
take up a central place in these writings. 
In ~ oontra Fortunatum Manichaeum, the will is pictured as 
freely choosing sane option which may result in an experience of 
pleasure. The attraction of this pleasure may entice the will to fOJ:m a 
habit of choosin;J in such a way that the pleasure is repeated. This 
habit am beoane so stronq that the will may be unable to conquer it. 
Before this habit is famed, the will is free to choose or refuse the 
option. It is only after choice is made that the pleasure produces the 
habit which may beoane bindinq on the will. It is the disposition to 
fo:m habits in this way that is inherited fran Mam. GUilt and m:>ral 
difficulty are not mentioned as beinq directly inherited. 
In De libero arbitrio III, AugUstine is holding that the nature of 
Mam himself was oorrupted when he sinned. This corruption resulted in 
61 Ibid. 
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the inability to choose rightly, in a consistent manner, or to 
acoanplish that little bit which is rightly chosen. This corrupt nature 
is inherited by all of the descendants of Mam. As a result, Au:JUStine 
introduced the distinction between the freedan of the will with which 
Mam was created and that which all subsequent generations experience. 
Adam had a total freedan of indifference. He oould choose to be good or 
evil. Ea.ch of his descendents have a limited freedan of indifference. 
The choice is available to be evil or to turn for divine aid in order 
to be good. Whether the person turns for this help or not is within the 
power of the person's will. This is so even if it is not in the power 
of a person's will to live rightly independently of divine aid. 
In both of these works Au;Justine seems to be sbifti.D;J his position 
on the freedan of the will towards a OClli)a.tibilist one. certainly, 
there is a recognition that outside factors have a great influence on 
the ability of the will to choose rightly. A careful CXl1'pll'ison of the 
texts will reveal, however, that he still bolds that ''necessary'' and 
"voluntary'' are of contrary mea,ninJ. Au;JUStine still bolds the 
iruxrnpatibilist position in that the voluntary nature of the choice 
implies that the will oould have chosen each of the two options wit.bout 
a change in antecedent conditions. 
This beoaDes clear when it is reme,nl:)Ared that, in the diSC11Ssion 
of di vine foreknowledge and human freedan, Au;JUStine was attenpti.D;J to 
show ''bow it can be possible that these two propositions are not 
contradictory and i'10Cl1'piltible, namely that God has foreknowledge of 
all future events, and that we sin voluntarily and not by 
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necessity. 1162 craig's analysis of this is helpful: 
an the oanpatibilist view, Au;Justine has to reject the seoond as 
false, for we do indeed sin voluntarily and by necessity. But the 
whole intention of Au;Justine is to shaw that both propositions are 
true.63 
Augustine's assertion is that we sin voluntarily and not by 
necessity. In his view, these are clearly contrary to one another. The 
fact that be takes so many pages to daoonstrate that divine 
foreknowledge does not introduce the kind of necessity which eliminates 
the voluntary nature of a sinful choice is all the mre support for the 
claim that be is boldm;J the incmpltibilist position. 
In Acta contra Fortuna.tum Manichaeum, Augustine argues that there 
is no sin where there is oanpul.sion. He writes, ''be who is oa:ipelled by 
nature to do~, does not sin. But be who sins, sins by free 
will. 1164 In this same passage, be equates a person's sinning by free 
will with sinning "of his own will" and also with sinning voll.mtarily. 
These are contrasted with :being oai;,elled by nature. If it is our 
nature that produces sin, it is not our will and the sin is not 
voluntary, it is necessary. Even when the moral agent is bound by 
habit, the person became bo1md voluntarily and can turn voluntarily to 
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Dur~ this period, fran his ordination to the priesthood to his 
advancanent to the rank of bishop, ~ine' s view of the freedan of 
the will was in transition. There are four observations to be made. 
First, it is still considered part of the essential nature of sin that 
it be voluntary. This is understood as be~ in contrast with 
oanpulsion or necessity. unless the will could have chosen either 
option, it is not a voluntary choice. 
The second observation is that sin is still located in the 
disordered will which chooses to prefer a lower good to the highest 
good. The object which the soul prefers is not, in itself, evil. 
Third, ~ine takes a deeper and more realistic look at the 
moral struggle. He acknawledges that out of certain choices of the will 
habits of choice can arise which are difficult or inpossible to 
overoane. Even within this period, his view of the depth of the 
difficulty inherited fran Mam increased. 
The fourth observation is that divine aid is necessary in order 
for the will to overoane its difficulties and turn to God. It seems 
that AugUstine bolds that it is within the power of the soul to be 
will~ to turn to God even if the actual turning can only be 
acx,anplished with divine aid. This aid canes to those who choose to be 
will~ to turn to God. In this way if the individual chooses to be 
will~ to turn to God, he or she will be able to turn. The ability to 
turn, however, is fran God. 
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We shall see in the next chapter that ~ine will bold that 
even the willin;ness to turn to God is a gift fran God. It is not 
within the soul's power to be willin:1 unless God intervenes to enable 
the soul to be williDJ. 
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CJmPl'ER IV 
AUGUSTINE'S VIEW OF '!'HE FREEIXH OF '!'HE WILL 
IN '!'HE ~y ~ OF HIS EP~ 
It was shortly before Christmas in 395, when Valerius elevated 
Augustine fran the rank of priest to that of coadjutor-bishop. 
Au:Justine bad already been USm;J his extraordinary gifts to handle much 
of the blrden of the administration of the church. Within a year of 
this praootion, Valerius had died and AUgUstine became the ruling 
bishop in Hi.J;p). He served in this capacity for the ranaiJ>der of his 
life. 
As we noted earlier, 1 the church in Hippo was surrouMed by 
controversies with Manichaeans and Donatists. MeetiD;J the challenge of 
these sects with sennons, debates and other works occupied much of 
Augustine's attention. In addition, he delivered many exegetical 
sennons and wrote on exegetical problems. Of special significance is De 
diversis guaestionibls ad Sipm1.icianum which ~tine sent to the 
bishop Simplician in response to questions oonoernm;J several difficult 
portions of scripture. ------1 see p. 46, aJ:x:Jve. 
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In these early years as bishop, Al¥11,lstine also wrote what has 
beoane his most widely read work, the COnfessiones. He began in 397 and 
0C1Dpleted it by 401. 2 This work can be considered an autobiography of 
the heart. Au;JUstine is less concerned with events and achievements 
than he is with the developnent of his interior life. The constant 
thane of his confessiBJ is his heart and haw his motivations shaped his 
thought and life. 
The COnfessiones is a rich mine fran which much can be quarried 
regarding Augustine's life, thought and concerns. I shall concentrate 
my study of this period on Au;JUstine's view of the freedan of the will. 
Fran both the COnfessiones and De diversis quaestioni.bus ad 
Aimplicianum we shall see a position on the freedan of the will which 
represents significant developnents fran his earlier views. These two 




surprisiBJly enough, therefore, the austere answer to the 
seoond Problan of the Various Problems for Rimplicianus is the 
intellectual. charter of the confessions. For both books faced 
squarely the central problan of the nature of h1mm motivation. In 
both books, the will is now seen as dependent on a capacity for 
"delight", and conscious actions as the result of a mysterious 
alliance of intellect and feeliBJ: they are merely the final 
outgrowth of hidden processes, the processes by which the ''heart" 
is "stirred", is "massaged and set" by the band of God~ 3 -
See Peter Brown, p. 184. 
Peter Brown, p. 170. 
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~tine's view of the Freedan of the Will in 
De Diversis Quaestionibus M Sinp1.iciamn 
Simplician was the man who succeeded ~ as bishop in Milan in 
397. 4 He bad made Au;1UStine's acquaintance before the latter's 
conversion in 386. Simplician had influenced Au;1UStine greatly by both 
encouraging him to read the Platonists and by telling him of the 
conversion of Victorinus (the translator of the Platonist writings 
which ~tine was readi~) •5 over the years the two maintained 
contact. Simplician bad read Au;1UStine's EKpositio quarundam 
propositionum ex &Jistola ad Rananos and requested further help in 
understanding sane of st. Paul's difficult texts. ~tine was only 
too pleased to try to solve the perplexities and sent De diversis 
guaestionibus ad Sinplici.anum with a cover letter, probably in 397. In 




As for the questions which you have condescended to oarm;u:X, me 
to resolve, even if tllrou;Jh the dullness of my mind I did not 
understand than, I might tllrou;Jh the assistance of your merits find 
an answer to than. This only I ask, that on acoount of my weakness 
you intercede with God for me, and that whatever writings of mine 
oane into your sacred hands, whether on the topics to which you 
have in a manner so kind and fatherly directed my attention, or on 
any others, you will not only take pains to read than, but also 
accept the charge of reviewing and correcting than; for I 
acknowledge the mistakes which I myself have made, as readily as 
the gifts which God bas bestowed on me. 6 
see the Introduction to To Sinplician - on Various 
Questions in Al.¥;1µstine: Farlier Writi.J;ss ed. J. H. 
S. Burleigh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1953), p. 372. All citations of To Simplician 
(hereafter M simp-) are to this translation. 
see Conf., VIII, 2. 
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Book I oonsists of A1.¥JUstine's treatment of two questions. The 
first is ooncerni.n;J the text of ~n.q 7:7-25. The second is on Ranans 
9:10-29. It is Augustine's exposition of this second question which is 
so vital in seein1 the developnent of his views. This is the same 
passage on which he wrote just two years earlier in QUestion 68 of De 
diversis quaestionil:lus LXXXIII.7 Iookin1 back over his treatment of 
this second question sane thirty years later, Augustine writes, "In the 
solution of this question, I, indeed, labored in defense of the free 
choice of the human will; mt the grace of God 001XIll9red ••• • ,.S It is 
in this section that Augustine elaborates a view of the efficacy of 
human choice which is, acoordin1 to sane cxmnentators, his mature 
view. 9 
Augustine looks into this section of scripture by first oonsultin1 
the oontext. He wishes to understand this particular passage in light 






It is that no man should glory in meritorious works, in which the 
Israelites dared to glory, alleging that they bad served the law 
that bad been given to them, and that for that reason they had 
received evcm;,elical grace as due to their merits. so they were 
unwillin1 that the same grace should :be given to the Gentiles, as 
if they are unworthy of it unless they undertook to observe the 
Jewish sacred rites. 10 
For the date of 394-395 for the questions on st. 
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Paul's purpose in the book of Ranans, then, is to demonstrate that 
no person can boast in his or her own works as if they can win God's 
awrovaJ.. This sheds light on Paul's meaning in the passage at band. 
Grace and meritorious works cannot ooex:i st. They are q:,posites. 
Augustine writes, ''The Jews did not understand that evangelical grace, 
just because of its very nature, is not given as a due reward for good 
works. otherwise grace is not grace." 11 
Augustine's concern is not to eliminate or to belittle good works. 
He wishes to anphasize the nature of grace. Specifically, that grace, 
by definition, precedes works. ''No man is to think that be has received 
grace because be has done good works. Rather, be bad not done good 
works unless be bad received grace through faith. 1112 It takes a 
gracious work of God in order for an individual to perfoxm anything 
that is good. Augustine writes, ''And good works, if there are any, 
follow and do not precede that grace, as has been said. 1113 
Augustine claims that, in the passage fran Ranana 9, we have been 
given proof that grace does precede works. This is the point of Paul's 
explanation of the election of Jacob over Esau. Before these twins were 
even born, God chose the ~er, Jacob, to be beir of the pranises of 
God. It would be Jacob's line, rather than Esau's which would bring 
forth the Messiah of Israel. It is an important fact that this choice 
of God happened before either Jacob or Esau were born. Augustine cites 
the Scripture, "'For the children being not yet born and having done 








was said unto her, the elder shall serve the younger. "' 14 since the 
choice occurred before birth, neither Jaoob nor Esau oould have merited 
God's selection by their good works. Au;Ustine writes of this text, 
''Grace is therefore of him who calls, and the oonsequent good works are 
of him who receives grace. Good works do not procluoe grace bit are 
produced by grace."15 
Au;JUstine then investigates the JDealUBJ of the verse, '"l'bat the 
purpose of God acoording to election might stand." (Ranans 9:11) He 
raises several questions about this verse. First, ''Haw can election be 
just, indeed, bow can there be any kind of election, where there is no 
difference? 1116 If there is, as yet, no difference in works or in 
faith or in merit between Jaoob and Esau, what is there to dist~ 
between than, so that God should choose the one and not the other? 
There is nothing. 
AugUstine next asks, ''But bow oould there be election, or what 
kind of election could there be, if there was no distinction of merits 
because they were not yet born and had done nothing? 1117 Perhaps, be 
reasons, election is based upon sane distinction in their natures. He 
rejects this, after oonsidering it, because of the fact that Jaoob and 
Esau were twins. As a result, there was no difference in the 
circumstances surrounding their oonoeption or birth that oould have 
produced sane difference in their natures. Au;Ustine especially points 
out that the case of twins is an important counter example to the 
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Au:iustine next considers whether or not God's election of Jaoob 
and rejection of Esau oauld have been based on Bis foreknawlecge of 
Jacob's future faith and Esau's future lack of faith. 1'0oUld it be 
'acoordi.rq to election' because God bas foreknowlecge of all thin;JS, 
and foresaw the faith that was to be in Jacob even before he was 
born? 1118 Augustine rejects this also. Bis aJ:'glDellt is that there is 
little difference, if any, between God foreknowing Jacob's faith and 
foreknowing his works. Neither Jacob's faith nor his good works had 
been in existence when Jacob was chosen to rule over Esau. If Paul, in 
this text, is~ that election cannot be based on works sinply 
because election preceded the lives, and therefore, the works of those 
involved, he cannot at the same time bold that election was based on 
God's foreknowl~e of Jacob's faith which was equally non-existent at 
the time of Jacob's election. Ju.st as Jacob bad done nothing either 
good or evil prior to birth, be oauld not have believed anythin"J 
before God had chosen him. 
It is significant that Augustine rejects the view that election is 
based on foreknc:lwl~e, because this is the very view be expounded on 
this verse in his Expositio guanmdam propositiom:m ex Epistola ad 
Rananos and his De diversis guaestionil:us LXXXIII in 394-395. However, 
at the present time, Au:JUStine writes: 
18 
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The apostle, therefore, did not want us to understand that it was 
because of God's foreknc:lwl~e that the yc>lll'ger was elected to be 
served by the elder •••• It was not of works, because being not yet 
born they had done no works. But neither was it of faith, ~use 
they had not faith either. What, then, was the reason for it? 9 
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~ turns again to the text but with a slightly different 
reading in order to try to shed light on its meaning. 1'P0ssibly we are 
to make a distinction here. Perhaps we should connect the words, 1 That 
the pw:pose of God according to election might stand,, with what 
precedes rather than with what follows. 1-2° In this case the sentence 
should not be read as, 1"l'he elder shall serve the younger in order that 
God1 s pw:pose according to election might stand." This is the reading 
that inplies that there is sane~ in the younger that merited his 
selection aver the elder. Rather the sentence should be read as, ''When 
they were not yet born and bad done neither good nor evil, that the 
purpose of God according to election might stand ••• 11 ~tine writes 
that this means: 
There oould be no election on acoount of good works, according to 
which the pw:pose of God might stand. So ''not of works but of him 
that calleth, 11 that is, of God who justifies the ungodly by grace 
calling him to faith, 11it was said to her, the elder shall serve 
the younger." So that the pw:pose of God does not stand accordHlg 
to election, but election is the result of the pw:pose of God.21 
The fact that the elder was going to serve the younger was decided 
by God before either was born and bad done anything either good or 
evil. :rt is this prior choice of God, which is not according to 
anything but God's own call, that is so in order that "the pw:pose of 
God according to election might stand." God's pw:pose ~rding to 
election is for him to call indivicJual.s purely by his own free choice 
and undeserved favor without regard to their merit or faith. This 
20 
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oanpletely rules out any boasting. •'BUt bere, when be says, 1 Not of 
works tut of him that calleth,' be wants us to \DXlerstand that it is 
not by election ~ merits, tut by tbe free gift of God, so that no 
man may exult in his good works.,-2 2 
In light of the fact that election is based purely upon God's own 
choice, Au:]Ustine asks, •'Whether faith merits a man's justification, 
whether the merits of faith do not precede the mercy of God; or 
whether, in fact, faith itself is to be JllDbered amo?q the gifts of 
grace.,-2 3 He quickly concludes that faith itself is a gift of grace. 
•'Unless, therefore, the mercy of God in callin:;J precedes, no one can 
even believe, and so begin to be justified and to receive power to do 
good works. So grace canes before all merits. 1-24 Au:JUStine's 
oonclusion oonoerning Jacob's election, then, is that it was entirely 
of God who called Jacob and not in any way of Jacob's works or faith. 
Au:]Ustine next turns his attention to the rejection of Esau. He 
asks, ''Haw oould he have merited this by evil deeds of his own doin:;J, 
since these thiD:;Js were spoken before he was bom, and before he bad 
done au;Jht of good or evil?•-2 5 Esau's rejection oould not have been 
because God bad foreknown his evil deeds or his lack of faith. 
otherwise, Al¥]UStine notes, •'he must also have predestined Jacob to be 
served by his elder brother because he foreknew his future good 
works.,-2 6 
Au;1UStine asks, then, "[H]ow did Esau deserve to be hated before 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., I, Q. 2, 7. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., I, Q. 2, 8. 
26 Ibid. 
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he was born?•-2 7 It seems iooonceivable that God would make an.ythiD;J 
that He would bate bit it bas been shown that Esau did not merit either 
hatred or love. There must be sane other answer. Augustine notes that 
Paul, in the passage of scripture, anticipates these kinds of questions 
by asJti.D;J •'What shall we say, then? Is there unrighteousness with God? 
God forbid ••• For be saith to Moses, I will have mercy on wban I will 
have mercy, and I will show a::mpassion on wban I will have OClllpaSSion.11 
(:Rananq 9:15) Augustine oaunents on this, "If God will have mercy on 
wban be will have mercy and show oc:q>aSSion to wban be will show 
0C1DpaSsion, our chief difficulty n,nai:ns, which is, why did his mercy 
fail in Esau's case? 1-28 
The mercy of God is so canplete as to produce faith sufficient for 
justification in whanever it is on wban God bestows it. Augustine 
writes: 
If anyone boasts that he bas merited CXIJJ[)"Ssion by his faith, let 
him know that God gave him faith. God shows OCIJp!SSion by inspiring 
faith in one on wban be bad OC'll'p'ISSion in~~ to one who was 
still an unbeliever a share in his callm;. 
The question remains as to why Esau did not receive the mercy that 
would have produced the faith and good works in him. Augustine 
considers whether or not the answer could be that Esau was unwilliD; to 
receive it. If, however, Esau did not receive God's mercy because he 
was unwillm;, Jacob must have received mercy because be was williD;. 
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williD;Jness. Perhaps,~ considers, the willi~s to receive 
mercy is also a gift fran God. 
or can no one believe unless be wills, or will unless be is called, 
and can no one be called unless God by calling him also gives him 
faith? For no one can believe gniess be is called, altho\.r;Jh none 
can believe against bis will. 3 
It must be observed that a person's believing, ~ here 
implies, is never against the person's will. It is always in accordance 
with the will. This is important in that~ will insist that the 
person is free in bis or her believing even tho\.r;Jh God gives the will 
to believe. As we shall see, be is beginning to use "free'' and 
''Voluntary" in a sense which does not necessarily illply the freedc:m of 
indifference. 
If willin;ness to receive God's mercy is itself part of God's 
mercy, the question still stands as to why Esau was not given this 
mercy. Be was rejected and yet, it seems, God could have given him the 
mercy necessary to be willing to receive and to have faith. 
But Esau was not yet born and consequently could be neither willing 
nor miwilling in all these matters. Why was be rejected while be 
was still in the wanb? We cane back to that difficulty, troubled 
not only by the ~ty of the question but also by our own 
abundant repetition. 1 
Au;JUstine looks at the sentence, ''Therefore it is not of him that 
willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that bath mercy'' (Ran.ans 
9:16) and he relates it to Philiwians 2:12,13 where Paul writes, •'Work 
30 
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out your own salvation with fear and tranbling; for it is God which 
worketh in you both to will and to do his good pleasure." Of these 
Al¥;JUstine writes, 1"l'bere be clearly shows that the good will itself is 
w:rou;iht in us by the worltinJ of God. 1132 Be explains: 
Clearly it is vain for us to will unless God have mercy. But I do 
not know bow it could be said that it is vain for God to have mercy 
unless we willingly consent. If God bas mercy, we also will, for 
the power to will is given with the mercy itself. It is God that 
worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure. If we 
ask whether a good will is a gift of God, I should be SU1'prised if 
anyone would venture to deny that. But because the good will does 
not precede the calling, rut calling precedes the good will, the 
fact that we have a good will is rightly attributed to God who 
calls us, and the fact that we are called cannot be attributed to 
ourselves. so the sentence, 11It is not of him that willeth, nor of 
him that nmneth, rut of God that bath mercy'' cannot be taken to 
mean simply that we cannot attain what we wish without the aig of 
God, blt rather that without his calling we cannot even will. 3 
The act of willing is itself, then, a result of the mercy of God. 
The ability of a person to will is dependent upon God's gift of mercy 
to that individual. The efficacy of God's gift of mercy to an 
individual is in no way dependent upon that individual's williIX1ness to 
receive it or to will it. This is because the willing itself, any good 
willing, is included in the gift of mercy. God's choice of an 
individual precedes and is necessary and sufficient for that 
individual's good will. This dependence of a person's will upon God, 
Al¥;JUstine claims, is not merely a dependenoe upon God in order to have 
the power to aCCX"ITlish what is willed. It is a dependence for the very 
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This is a very different view of the will's dependence upon God 
than Au';JUStine defended in De libero arbitrio III. 34 There we saw 
that the will to turn to God seems to be within the power of the 
individual prior to God's intervention. The view, here, that the will 
to turn to God is not in the power of the individual without God's 
intervention is what we have called the 0a1p1t:ibilist view of the 
freedan of the will. 
Au';JUStine introduces a distinction between an effectual call of 
God and a non-effectual. call. This is to take into consideration the 
text in Matthew 20:16 in which it is written, ''Many are called tut few 
are chosen." If there is no distinction between calls, then it is in 
the power of sane individuals, if not all, to choose whether or not 
they will respond to God's call. If this were the case, Au';JUStine 
writes, "it oould be said correctly that it is not of God who bath 
mercy, tut of the man who willeth and nmneth, for the mercy of him 
that calleth is not sufficient unless the obedience of him who is 
called follows. 1135 Since this view bas already been rejected, 
Au';JUStine concludes that there must be two types of calling. 
34 
35 
Many, that is to say, are called in one way, tut all are not 
. affected in the same way; and those only follow the calling who are 
found fit to receive it •••• For God calls in the way that is suited 
to those who follow his callin;J. The call canes also to others; tut 
because it is such that they cannot be m::,ved by it and are not 
fitted to receive it, they can be said to be called tut not chosen. 
And again it 'WOU.l.d not be true that it is not of God who bath mercy 
tut of man who willeth and nmneth. For the effectiveness of God's 
mercy cannot be in the power of man to frustrate, if be will have 
none of it. If God wills to have mercy on men, be can call than in 
a way that is suited to than, so that they will be moved to 
See pp. 69, 70 above. 
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lmderstand and to follow. 36 
God's mercy, then, is not extended to all who are called. It is 
extended only to those who are chosen. In this way it can be true that 
''God bas mercy on no man in vain. 1137 Au;JUStine continues: 
Those are chosen who are effectually called. Those who are not 
effectually called and clo not obey their calling are not chosen, 
for althou3'h they were called they did not follow •••• For, althcu;Jh 
he calls many, he bas mercy on those whan he calls in a way suited 
to than so that they may follow. But it is false to say that "it is 
not of God who ha.th mercy l::ut of man who willeth and runneth," 
because God bas mercy on no man in vain. He calls the man on whan 
he bas mercy in~ way he knows will suit him, so that he will not 
refuse the call. 8 
This distinction between an effectual and a non-effectual call 
raises several important issues and is the basis upon which lnmm 
freedan is preserved in light of what seems to be the irresistil:>le 
mercy of God. I shall make several observations. First, it is to be 
rEIDEIJJ}:)Ared that God's call is not based upon a foreknowledge of the 
individual's response. This, as we have seen, bolds God's call bostage 
to the will of man. God does, however, know haw an individual would 
respond if a certain call is given, and, presumably, haw he would 
respond if a different call is given. 
second, it seems that this knowledge is the means by which God 
chooses which type of call to send to individuals. He knows what would 
constitute an effectual call and what would constitute a non-effectual. 








whan He chooses to have mercy and He bestows a non-effectual. call on 
those on whan He chooses to withhold mercy. 
Third, it is by a voll.mtary choice of the will, that an individual 
responds to God's effectual call. Twice in the cited passage Au;Justine 
emphasizes this. God calls the chosen individual "in a way suited to 
than so that they may follow." ltgain, A1¥;JUStine writes, "He calls the 
man on whan he has mercy in a way he knows will suit him, so that he 
will not refuse the call." God's call does not overoane the will of the 
man. He calls those whan He chooses in conjunction with their willing 
so they ''may follow'' and so they ''will not refuse." These phrases 
indicate that when a man is chosen, God chooses him bit he also 
voll.mtarily responds to the call. It is not that God's choice is based 
on His foreknowledge of the free choice, blt, rather, on God's 
knowledge of which calling would effectually elicit the voll.mtary 
response which He wants. God sends this effectual calling to precisely 
those individuals He chooses. 
The sentence, ''He calls the man on whan he has mercy in a way he 
knows will suit him, so that he will not refuse the call," oanbines all 
of the elements I have pointed out. First, God knows what call will 
suit the man. In other words, He knows that the man would respond if a 
certain call is given and that he would not if another call is given. 
seoond, it is this knowledge that is the l:lasis for God's 9eD(ling one 
type of call rather than another in order to achieve His desired 
result. Third, since God knows haw the man would respond to different 
calls, the call that He sends is suited to the individual and the 
individual will freely respond. The effectual call elicits a voluntary 
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response l:lut it is the response that God wills. It does not go aga;nst 
the will of the individual. and it oould not go against God's purpose. 
AD;;JUStine's overriding ooncern in this section is to show that 
God's choice is not dependent on the lnmm will :but on His own choice 
to bestow mercy. That he bas successfully preserved this is evident in 
the fact that God sends whichever calling He wills in order to get the 
result He chooses. If He wishes to have mercy on a man, He sends a call 
He knows will be effectual. If He chooses to not extend his mercy, he 
will send a call which He knows will not be effectual. That any 
individual is chosen, then, is not up to that individual., even ~h 
the individual freely responds to the call. It is due to God's mercy in 
sending the effectual call that He knew would elicit the free response. 
The fact that God calls sane individuals in a way He knows will be 
effectual raises questions about why He would not call every person 
effectually and why He calls certain individuals effectually and leaves 
others with a non-effectual call. In the oontext of the passage in 
"Ranans, the question is, ''why was not Esau called in such a way that he 
would be willing to obey? 1139 Al.¥JU9tine denies that it was lll)OSSil>le 
for God to call him in this manner. He writes, ''who would dare to 
affinn that God bas no method of calling whereby even Esau might have 
awlied his mind and yoked his will to the faith in which Jaoob was 
justified? 1140 What the scripture may refer to as the hardening of a 
person's heart canes fran a divine penalty for sin. 
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But if the obstinacy of the will can be such that the mind's 
aversion fran all modes of calling becxoes bardened, the question 
is whether that very hardening does not cane fran sane divine 
penalty, as if God ahandons a man by not calling him in the way in 
which be might be n:wed to faith. 1lbo would dare to affil:m thai the 
0Dnipotent lacked a method of persuading even Esau to believe? 1 
By this hardening of a person's heart, ~ does not mean 
that God makes a righteous person :t>eoane unrighteous. He acts lmjustly 
to no one. Rather, ''the hardening which God causes is an miwillingness 
to be merciful. We must not think that anything is inp,sed by God 
whereby a man is made worse, but only that be provicles nothing whereby 
a man is made better. 1142 God sil!ply chooses not to provide the 
effectual call that is necessary in order for the person to respond in 
faith and receive justification. This is not lmjust in that God is not 
withholding anything that is due the individual. In those instances 
where God does choose to call effectually, this gitt of mercy is purely 
an undeserved gift of graoe. 
A1.¥;JU.stine acknowlecges that this is difficult to accept. Anyone 
might be tempted to raise the objections the apostle himself raises, 
'"l'bou wilt say then lmto me, Why doth be still find fault? For who 
withstandeth his will? 1143 In response, A1.¥;JUstine argues that it is 
not lmjust for God to have mercy on sane but to withhold mercy fran 
others. It is true that whatever reason there may be for His choice of 
one individual over another is beyond the In.mm ability to understand. 
A1.¥;JU.stine1 s argument for the justice of God proceeds fran a oarp'\rison 
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of which consist of debts. No one is oonsicSered mirighteous or unjust 
for expecting pajlDSDt for a debt. en tba other band, if tba creditor 
wishes to forgive a particular individual. 1 s debt, this also does not 
violate justice. ~ points out that, •'This decision does not lie 
with those who are debtors bit with tba creditor.11 44 
This 0a1111cm ooourrenoe in h1mn society is similar to God's 
deal~ with humanity. ~ writes: 
Now all men are a mass of sin, since, as the apostle says, "In Adam 
all die'' (I oor. 15:22), and to Mam the entire h1mn race traces 
the origin of its sin against God. sinful hmanity must pay a debt 
of punismnent to the supreme divine justice. ~ that debt is 
exacted or ranitted there is no mirighteousness. 
'l'be critical point is that God does not cause any person to sin. 
Both the one who reoei ves mercy and the one who does not are ~ 
of the punisbnent. 'l'be only difference is that God chooses to ranit the 
debt of the one and to exact the debt of the other. This is also a 
different view of original sin than that which we observed in De libero 
art:>itrio III. 46 Here, Augustine illplies that it is sanething m:>re 
than m:>ral difficulty (or the disposition to fo:m certain habits of the 
soul) that is inherited. Guilt, which merits divine punismnent, is also 




To be sure, no one resists bis will. Both be who is aided and 
be who is left belong to the same mass of sin. Both deserve the 
punismnent which is exacted fran the one and ranitted to the 
other •••• only let us hold fast with unshakable faith the fact that 
there is no unrighteousness with God; so that, whether be ranits or 
exacts the debt, be cannot rightly be chuged with unrighteousness 
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by him fran wban be exacts it; and be wbo receives remission O\.¥]ht 
not to glory in his own merits. 'l'be fozmer pays back nothing mt 
what be owes, and the latter bas nothing that be bas not 
reoeived. 47 
At this point, ~ bas ooncl.uded that two statanents which 
are in Peening conflict are actually both true. 'l'be first statanent is 
that God's election of Jaoob and his rejection of Esau was prior to and 
not influenced by their works (good or evil) , their faith (or lack of 
faith), or any other distinction between than. This is cx:q,letely a 
result of the free choice of God. Secxmdl.y, it is true that there is no 
injustice in God's choice. Electing one and rejecting another is 
entirely just. 
The next ~t difficulty Ai.¥JUStine seeks to resolve consists 
of two Scripture verses. one reads, •"l'bau batest nothing that Thou bast 
made. 1148 The second is "Jacob I loved, mt Esau I bated." (Ranami 9: 
13). Al.¥JUStine claims that God does not bate Esau the man, wbo is a 
creation of God and is therefore good. God bates the sin which is a 
perversity of the good nature which God created. As Au;JUStine writes, 
''God does not bate Esau the man, mt Esau the sinner •••• They are both 
men and sinners, men as fashioned by God, sinners by their own 
wills. 1149 In this way God does not bate anything Be bas made, Be only 
bates the evil which is not a created thing at all. 
As be SllllDarlzes his explanation of the difficulties in RaDans 9, 
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roan for boa.stin:;J before God. He writes, •'The apostle, therefore, and 
all those who have been justified and have dem:mstrated for us the 
understandiD;1 of grace, have no other intention than to shaw that be 
that glories should gloi:y in the I.ord.,.so A1J;1UStine then asserts sane 
of the iq;,lications of his inte%pretation for the notion of free will: 
Free will is ioost important. It exists, indeed. but of what value 
is it in those who are sold under sin? ••• We are cxmnanded to live 
righteously, and the reward is set before us that we shall merit to 
live b.aWily for ever. But who can live righteously and do good 
works lmless be has been justified by faith? We are cxmnanded to 
believe that we may receive the gitt of the Holy Spirit and beoaDe 
able to do good works by love. But who can believe lmless be is 
reached by sane call~, sane testimony :borne to the truth? Who has 
it in his power to have such a iootive present to his mind that his 
will shall be influenced to believe? Who can weloane in his mind 
sane~ that does not give him delight? But who has it in his 
power to ensure that sane~ that will delight him will turn up, 
or that be will take delight in what turns up? If those~ 
delight us which serve our advancement towards God, that is due not 
to our own whim or industi:y or meritorious works, but to the 
inspiration of God and to the grace which be bestows. He freely 
bestows upon us voll.mtary assent, yamest effort, and the power to 
perfom works of fervent charity. 5 
In light of Au;JU9tine1 s interaction with this passage in Ranans, 
his notion of free will, at this point, is not that of a will with the 
freedan of indifference. In other words, an individual does not have 
the ability to choose and perfom what is right apart fran God's 
intervention. The will, here, is free in that it is voltmtary. When an 
individual chooses to believe, that is a voltmtary choice. It is not 
autoncm::,us since it is God that gives the desire so to choose and 
bestows the effectual call. It is voluntary in that it it is in 
acoordance with the individual's desires. :It is not imposed fran sane 
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external. CXllpl].sion. God gives the voluntary assent. 
Since the fall of Adam, all hlnanCJ are enslaved to sin. This means 
they cannot, of their awn initiative, choose to becYJM and to do good. 
This freedcm, which existed in .Mam, was lost when .Mam sinned. Free 
will '1"8MiM but it is of no help unless God intervenes. This is seen 
in the above passage where~ writes, 1'0f what value is it [free 
will] in those who are sold under sin?'' ODly if God, in His mercy, 
chooses to effectually call an indiviclual will that person be able to 
respond to His grace. 
The only possible oonclusion is that it is wills that are elected. 
But the will itself can have no motive unless sanething presents 
itself to delight agd stir the mind. That this should ha~n is not 
in any man's power. 2 
It is, however, in the power of God to "delight and stir• the mind 
of anyone He chooses in such a way that they will voluntarily respond 
in faith. In light of our study, we see that Au:JUStine is boldm;l a 
cxq,atibilist view of the freedcm of the will. It is possible for the 
indiviclual to choose to turn to God only if a specific antecedent 
condition is ~ed. This is the presence of God's mercy expressed in 
an effectual call. unless God calls in this way, the person cannot will 
to turn. If God does call effectually, the person cannot refuse to will 
to turn. Goci's effectual call, then, is both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for the individual's turning to God. 
Au:JUStine is not cSenyin-J the freedcm of the will. The will is free 
even if the choice to turn to God is not within the power of the 
52 Ibid., I, Q. 2, 22. 
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individual. It is free because it is voluntary. If a person turns to 
God, that turning is in accordance with the person's will. If the 
person does not turn, the not turning is in acoordance with his or bar 
will. 'l\1rnilV] or not turning is never bp)sed agajnst the will of the 
individual. 
In this work, AD;1U5tine's use of the tel.'Dl ''voluntary'' is different 
fran that in his earlier works. Rather than the freedan to do 
otherwise, or the freedan of indifference, ''voluntary'' DOW' means "in 
acoordanoe with the will." Where ''voluntary'' and ''necessary'' were 
contraries, in De libero arbitrio, 53 DOW' they are not. A choice can 
be necessary and voluntary at the same time. If God does not grant an 
effectual call, a person's failure to turn to God is necessary. This is 
because it was not within his or bar power to turn to God. This failure 
is also voluntary because it is in acoordance with (not opposed to) the 
person's will. The heart of the questions Au;JUstine has investigated 
lies in the very nature and purposes of God, of wban he writes, ''But 
his judgements are inscrutable and his ways past fjnding out. 1154 
The Freedan of the Will in the Confessiones 
In De diversis guaestionibus ad Simplicianum, the case of Jacob 
and E:sau was scrutinized and insights were drawn regarding the freedan 
of the will. In the Oonfessiones, it is Augustine who is both the 
examiner and the narnined- I.Dok.ing over his life and growth fran early 
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childhood through his conversion, Au;;JUStine paints a picture of total 
dependence upon God. The many descriptions of his inner tm:moil are 
vivid illustrations of his perception of the freedan and ~le of 
his own will. The view that emerges is one fran a different perspective 
than that in the second question of Book I of De diversis guaestionibus 
ad flinplicianum. 
De diversis guaestionibus ad Simplicianum is a work of exegesis 
while the Oonfessiones is a work of introspection and prayer. Usilq the 
data of revelation, the fomer affords a look into the purposes of God. 
Usilq the data of experience, the latter reveals the mnan heart. While 
both works aiq:,hasize the individual's depemence on God, De diversis 
guaestionibus ad ainplicianum explores this fran God's perspective and 
the Oonfessiones views it fran that of the individual. 
Because of this, there is little speculation in the Oonfessiones 
concernin;J the general questions relatilq to the freedan of the will. 
AuJU9tine really does not discuss it at all. Rather, he unveils his 
deep reflection on his own experience. His agoey at beilq ''l:>ound, not 
with the irons of another, but my own iron wi11. 1155 and his lOD:Jilq 
for the true freedan which only God can brilq fill and overflow the 
pages. It is out of this personal story that sane observations al:>out 
the will's freedan can be ma.de. 
Book VIII of the Oonfessiones is that in which AuJUStine's 
struggle reaches a climax. Years of pursuing wisdan through the 
Manichaeans, scepticism, and into Neo-Platonism have led him to the 
doorstep of the Christian faith. He need only to enter. It is perhaps 
55 Oonf., VIII, 5, 10. 
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significant that Book VIII opens with ~ine seeking help fran 
S:i.nq:,licianus. SiJli,licianus encouraged ~ine in his rea.djng of the 
Platonists. He also related the story of the conversion of Victorinus, 
who was a faioous professor of rhetoric and translator of Platonic 
works. ~ine's reaction to the story was that be ''burned to imitate 
him. 1156 However, be found himself bound in his will. He felt that his 
will was sharply divided between the desire to turn fully to God and 
the strong inclination to retain control · of his life while oontimd ng 
to satisfy his passions. 
Another mesaEm;Jer, Pontitianus, arrived on sane official business. 
seeing the works of the 1'postle Paul on the table, Pontitianus, already 
a baptized Christian, related the story of Antony, the Egyptian, who 
travelled widely establishing c,amnmjties of m:mks. Pontitianus also 
told of two friends of the emperor who chanced to read the life of 
Antony and resolved, then and there, to renounce their positions and 
fortunes for the D:>nastic life. The illplct of their story upon 
Augustine was deep and powerful: 
SUCh was the story of Pontitianus. But Thou, o Lord, whilst be 
was speaking, didst turn me towards myself, taking me fran J:>ebj nd 
rrrt back, where I had placed myself while unwilling to exercise 
self-scrutiny; and Thou didst set me face to face with myself, that 
I might behold how foul ; was, and how crooked and sordid, 
bespotted and ulcerous. 5 
After Pontitianus left, AugUstine was deeply troubled. He cried 
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''What is wron; with us? What is this? What heardest thou? The 
\ml.earned start up and 'take' heaven. and we, with our learnin:J, 
but wantin;J heart, see where we wallow in flesh and blood! Because 
others have preceded us, are we ashamed to follow, and not rather 
ashamed at not followin:p." 58 
Again, it was Au:_1ustine's will which waged war within him. Be knew 
that he had to will resolutely in order to enter into God's will but he 
felt himself to be staggerin;J and swayin;J with a divided will. <me part 
seened to will to enter and the other fou;ht against enterin;J. God and 
continence beckoned fran one side while his passions beckoned fran the 
other: 
The very toys of toys, and vanities of vanities, my old 
mistresses, still enthralled me; they shook my fleshly ga:nnent, and 
whispered softly, ''Dost thou part with us? And fran that manent 
shall we no more be with thee for ever?" ••• Yet they did delay me, 
so that I hesitated to blrst and shake myself free fran them, and 
to leap over whither I was called, -an unruly ~it sayin;J to me, 
''Dost thou think thou canst live without them?" 9 
Augustine ran to the corner of the garden and cast himself down, 
weepin;J bitterly in prayer. Into his tllow;Jhts came the voice of a child 
chantin;J, ''Take up and read; take up and read. 1160 It came fran a 




So, restrainin;J the torrent of my tears, I rose up, interpretin;J it 
no other way than as a cx:moarv\ to me fran Heaven to open the book, 
and to read the first chapter I should light upon •••• I grasped, 
opened, and in silence read that paragraph on which my fl'JeB first 
fell, -''Not in riotin;J and dnmkenness, not in chamborin;J and 
wantonness, not in strife and envyin;J; but put ye on the Lord Jesus 
Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, to fulfill the lusts 
thereof." No further would I read, nor did I need; for instantly, 
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as the sentence ended, -by a light, as it were, of security infused 
into my heart,- all the gloan of doubt vanished away. 61 
He was finally converted. As we have observed, thro1.qbout this 
work, Augustine is not concerned with assertin;J and defendin;J a theory 
of the 1nnan will. He is reveal.in;J, by his own inner life, the entire 
person's absolute dependence upon God; incllldilq the r\ependence of the 
individual's will. This dependence is powerfully illustrated in several 
passages. For instance: 
[H] e appeared to me not m:::>re brave than happy, in bavi:D; thus 
disoovered an cg>ortunity of waitin;J on Thee only, Which thin:] I 
was sighin;J for, thus bound, not with the irons of another, but my 
own iron will. My will was the enany master of, and thence had made 
a chain for me and bound me. Because of a perverse will was lust 
made; and lust indulged in :became custan; and custan not resisted 
became necessity. By which links, as it were, joined together 
(whence I teim it a "chain") , did a hard bonclage bold me 
enthralled. But that new will had beglm to develop in me, freely to 
worship Thee, and to wish to enjoy Thee, o God, the only sure 
enjoyment, was not able as yet to overoane my fonner wilfulness, 
made stro~ by lo~ indulgence. Thus did my two wills, one old and 
the other new, one carnal, the other spiri~l, contend within me; 
and by their discord they unstrurX] my soul. 6 
In this passage the word "custan'' is consuetudo, which is often 
translated as ''babit. 1163 Augustine is describin;J the developnent and 
the bindin;J power of habit. He is not assertin;J that the habit produces 
a final necessity. It is true that habit fo:cms a chain which binds, :but 
it is a chain that can be broken. At this point in the :narrative, 
Augustine's new will is not stro~ enc>U1h to break the chain of habit. 
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bound by the habit f:can responsibility. This is because, as~ 
admits about b:imsel.f, the person will.ilqly enters into and strengthens 
the habit. The indiviclual. will~ly SIJCX!lnbs to habit even if he or she 
does not !fflCX!IPDb intentionally. ~ eq;,basizes that be will~ly 
pursued and fed his own lust and that this lust, so fed, resulted in a 
strengthened chain of habit. Be writes: 
And yet it was thJ:ou1h me that custan became more oanbati ve against 
me, because I bad cane will~ly whither I willed not. And who, 
then, can with any ~ustice speak against it, when just pmishment 
follows the sinner? 4 
~ did not will to be bound but he will~ly came to the 
place where he would be bound. This is enou;h to make him responsible. 
The pmishment which follows is just. Another sentenoe illustrates 
this, ''FOr the law of sin is the violence of custan, whereby the mind 
is drawn and held, even against its will; deserviig to be so held in 
that it so will~ly falls into it. 1165 once the person is chained by 
custan (babi t- oonsuetudo) , he is held against his will. A person who 
chooses to satisfy his or her lusts and oontimies to indulge in these 
lusts, becx:mes bound in them. Be or she will oontimJe to strive to 
satisfy them even if he or she would rather be free of them. 1'gainst 
the desires of the person, the will is bound. This cxmp1].sion is still 
blameworthy because it was entered and embraced volmitarily. A man 
volmitarily ~ b:imsel.f to a place f:can where he can only cry out, 
111 0 wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me f:can the body of this 
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death' but Thy graoe only, ~ Jesus airist our IDrd? 1166 
As Augustine grew closer to his oomrersion, the intensity of his 
divided will increased. He describes the will which can enter God's 
will and the will that cannot: 
I was disquieted in spirit, beiD1 most inpatient with myself that I 
entered not into Thy will and covenant, o my God, which all my 
bones cried out unto me to enter, extolling it to the skies. And we 
enter not therein by ships, or chariots, or feet, no, nor by goin:] 
so far as I had cane fran the house to that place where we were 
sittin:]. For not to go only, but to enter there, was nau;Jht else 
but to will to go, but to will it resolutely and tho~hly; not to 
stagger and sway about this way and that, a chargeable and 
half-~ will, wrestlin:], with one part fallin:] as another 
rose. · 
With a half-wounded will, be f0\.¥1ht against biJDSP.lf. He could not 
will resolutely. Augustine makes a point of observiD:] the difference 
between the ease with which his body responded to his will 's cxmwsnd 
and the difficulty the will itself bad in foll~ his desire to will 
to turn to God. He describes the ''monstrous thiD:]' 168 of the divided 




The mind oc:mnands the body, and it obeys forthwith; the mind 
oc:mnaDdcc itself and is resisted. The mind oam,and,.q the band to be 
moved, and such readiness is there that the oc:mnand is scarce to be 
distin'Juished fran the obedience. Yet the mind is mind, and the the 
band is body. The mind oc:mnands the mind to will, and yet, thou:;Jh 
it be itself, it obeyeth not •••• But it willeth not entirely; 
therefore it cc:mnandeth not entirely. For so far forth it 
ocmnandeth, as it willeth; and so far forth is the thin:] ocmnanded 
not done, as it willeth not •••• For were it entire, it would not 
even oc:mnand it to be, because it would already be. It is, 
therefore, no monstrous thin:] partly to will, partly to be 
unwillin], but an infi.mity of the mind, that it doth not wholly 
rise, sustained by truth, pressed down by custan. And so there are 
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two wills, because one of them is no~ entire: and the one is 
SlJWlied with what the other needs. 6 
~'s conclusion that there are two wills is not to be 
confused with the Manicbaean notion that there are two separate minds 
in each indiviclual. ~ digresses to a:cgue this point. He is 
emphasiziD;J that it is the one soul which is divided in intent rather 
than that tbere are two separate souls which are of divided purpose: 
one beiD;J good and the other evil, as in Mani.cbaeisn. The war which 
raged within him was not between two substances but between his desire 
to will entirely to turn to God and his refusiD;J to will entirely. He 
ocm:nents that "I neither willed entirely, nor was entirely unwilliD;J. 
Therefore was I at war with myself, and destroyed by myself. 1170 He 
concludes this digression against the Manichaean notion of two souls by 
assertin;J: 
Thus, also, when above eternity delights us, and the pleasure of 
teq;>oral goods bolds us down below, it is the same soul which 
willeth not that or this with an entire will, and is therefore tom 
asunder with grievous perplexities, while 'ff' of truth it prefers 
that, but out of custan foli>ears not this. 
ThrolxJbout the period iJl'IDMiately following ~'S 
consecration as bishop A1Y;1UStine held that the bman will is unable to 
turn to God without divine intervention. Both in his exegesis of Ranans 
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the individual upon God. God's mercy intervening is both a necessary 
and sufficient condition of the will's tumjng to God. This bas been 
seen in passages in De diversis guaestionjbJs ad ~jnpliciamn such as 
the following: 
Clearly it is vain for us to will tmless God have mercy. But I do 
not know bow it could be said that it is vain for God to have mercy 
tmless we willingly consent. If God bas mercy, we also will, for 
the power to will is given with the mercy itself. It is God that 
worketh in us both to will and to cSo of his good pleasure. If we 
ask whether a good will is a gitt of God, I should be sw:prised if 
anyone would venture to deny that. But because the good will does 
not precede the calling, b1t calling precedes the good will, the 
fa.ct that we have a good will is rightly attributed to God wbo 
calls us, and the fa.ct that we are called cannot be attributed to 
ourselves. So the sentence, 11It is not of h:im that willeth, nor of 
h:im that rmmeth, b1t of God that hath mercy" cannot be taken to 
mean simply that we cannot attain what we wish without the aid of 
God, but rather that without his calling we cannot even will. 72 
That God's intervention is a necessary condition of the 
individual's will turning to God can be seen in this passage by the 
first sentence: •'Clearly it is vain for us to will tmless God have 
mercy." Unless God has mercy, our willing is in vain. It cannot be 
efficacious. That God's mercy is a sufficient condition is seen fran 
the sentence: 11If God has mercy, we also will, for the power to will 
is given with the mercy itself." If God's mercy is present, as an 
effectual call, the individual will certainly will to turn to God. It 
is not in the power of the individual to refuse to turn if God supplies 
the mercy. This is the meaning of the sentence: •'BUt I: cSo not know bow 
it could be said that it is vain for God to have mercy tmless we 
willingly consent." Another passage that alludes to this is the 
72 M Si.mp., I, Q. 2, 12. 
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followin;;J: 
Those are chosen who are effectually called. 'l'bose who are not 
effectually called and do not obey their calling are not chosen, 
for al~ they were called they did not follow •••• For, althotgh 
he calls many, he bas mercy on those whclll he calls in a way suited 
to than so that they may follow. BUt it is false to say that 11it is 
not of God who bath mercy tiut of 111111 who willeth and runneth," 
becalise God bas mercy on no man in vain. Be calls the man on whcm 
be bas mercy in ~ way he knows will suit him, so that he will not 
refuse the call. 
~,~is eq;>basizing that, once the effectual call is 
given, the man cannot refuse. This is becalise an effectual call is by 
definition the call that God infallibly knows will elicit the response 
of faith. ~ writes that •'God bas mercy on no man in vain.'' The 
effectual call of God can thus be seen to be a sufficient condition of 
the b:urnan will 1 s turning to God. It is also, as we have seen, a 
necessary condition. This too can be seen in this passage. The first 
two sentences explain that only if the effectual call is present can 
the individual be said to be 11cbosen." Those who are not effectually 
called are not chosen and they do not respond. 
~ is clearly holding the OC11pc1til:>ilist position on the 
freedan of the will, as we have described it. 74 This is also implied 
in the Oonfessiones. While there is no systematic treatment of the 
freedan of he will, nowhere does AU;JUStine imply that the turning to 
God was up to him and within his power. Rather, we hear him cey out in 
his utter dependence upon God's mercy: 
73 
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unto Thee, -''But Thou, 0 Lord, Bow long?" ''Bow long, Lord? Wilt 
Thou be angry for ever? Oh, 1"'flDEIDber not against us fmmer 
iniquities;" for I felt that I was enthralled by them. I sent up 
these sorrowful cries, -''Bow lon;J, bow lon;J? Taoorrow, and 
tanorrow? Why not now? Why is there not this hour an end to my 
uncleanness?'' 75 
Durin;J the first years of Au;1UStine's life as a bishcp, the 
developnent of his view of the freedan of the will bas reached a very 
different position fran that which he had previously held. There are 
five brief observations to be made. First, a choice is free if it is 
voluntary. The use of the word ''voluntary" here is different fran the 
use in previous periods. Rather than iJil>lyi.D;J the freedan of 
indifference, a voluntary act is one which is in accordance with the 
individual's will whether or not the individual could have acted 
otherwise. In this sense, ALr;JUStine now held that an act could be both 
necessary and voluntary at the same time. It is necessarily true that, 
without the intervention of God, a person can not turn to Him in faith. 
The person's not turning is, however, voluntary. That is, it is not 
against the person's will. 
The seoond observation is that, as in the previous periods, 
Au;JUStine, at this time, still held that it was part of the essential 
nature of sin that it be voluntary. This voluntary nature of sin is 
what brought responsibility. An individual is responsible for an act if 
it was a voluntary act. Even if it was not within the individual's 
power to turn to God, because his or ber not turning was in aOOC>rdan0e 
75 OOnf., VIII, 12, 28. 
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with his or her will, the :individual is responsible for the fact that 
he or she did not turn to God. 
The third observation is that divine intervention is both a 
necessary and sufficient oondition for an individual to turn to God. 
'Onless God intervenes by bestowiD3' mercy, it is iq;,ossible for the 
individual to turn to God. It is beyond the ability of the individual 
to turn to God unless God first gives the person faith. If God 
intervenes by extendiJv;J His mercy to an individual, that individual 
will turn to God. This is because the mercy of God includes an 
effectual call of that individual. The call is effectual because God 
knows what call would be such to elicit the response of faith. God 
sends this effectual call to the individual on whan He chooses to have 
mercy and the person responds in faith. 
The fourth observation is that Augustine is very concerned with 
defendin;J the notion that ea.ch individual is 0a11>letely dependent upon 
God. His exposition of Ranans 9 and his explanation of his own 
experience both overflow with this thane. The individual's dependence 
upon God is consistent with the above observations that divine 
intervention is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for a 
person's turning to God. 
The fifth observation is that it awean to be more difficult, 
given this latest view, to bold that the origin and responsibility for 
evil can be traced to man and not God. If God's choice to send an 
effectual call is J:iased solely on His own will, no individual. can be · 
held responsible for the type of call he or she receives. If an 
effectual call is both a necessary and sufficient condition for a 
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person's turning to God, it is difficult to see bow the :indivic!ual. 
could be in any way blameworthy if be or she failed to turn to God. The 
view that the :individual. was free because the not turning was in 
accordance with the :individual's will, does not sean to alleviate the 
difficulty. It would sean to be a difficult task to apply the view 
Au;Ustine awears to bold durin:} the early years of his episoopacy to 
the problan of evil. 
In the next chapter, we shall see bow three specific factors 
ex>ntr:ibuted to the developnent of Au:;JU,stine's view of the f~ of 
the will ~t the period we have traced. The first oontr:imtin:} 
factor is the increase in Au:;JU,stine's reliance upon and familiarity 
with the Scriptures. This came about as a result of his duties as a 
priest and bishop. The second factor is his observations about bis own 
mral and spiritual stiu3gle. The last factor is his confrontation with 
the mra1 and spiritual ~le of his parish. These influenced him to 
,-eoogni~e the role of habit and the role of God's intervention in the 
:individual's life. 
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We have traced how ~tine's view of the freedan of the will 
developed throt¥Jhout the period between his conversion to Christianity 
in 386 and his early years as bishop. In the first few years after 
becxlning a Christian, ~ine held an inoalpati.l:>ilist view. That is, 
he held that it is within an individual's power, without any change in 
anteoedent conditions, either to turn to God or to turn away. 
Specifically, he held that God's intervention was not necessary to 
enable an individual to turn to God. After becxJning a priest, Au;1USti.ne 
began to recognize the power that habits bad in hindering the will of a 
person. Shortly after he was consecrated as bishop, he began to bold 
the oanpati.l:>ilist view in that God's intervening mercy was both a 
necessary and a sufficient condition for an individual's turning to 
God. 
As we observe the changes in his life calling throu;Jhout this 
period, three tbEmes anerge which it is reasonable to postulate as 
influences that led to this develqment in ~i.ne's view of the 
freedan of the will. These are the influence of the scripture, that of 
Au;1UStine's own moral and spiritual str1J:Nle, and that of his pastoral 
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work of tryi.D;J to help his co~egation live D:)rally and spiritually. 
In this chapter I shall briefly explain each of these t:banes and I 
shall show how ea.ch of these may have played sane role in the 
developnent of Augustine's position regardiD;J the freedan of the will. 
The Influence of scripture 
Althou;1h Au;Justine was acquainted with the scriptures ~ 
his life and bad oane to anbraoe them as authoritative, when be became 
priest he felt a desperate need to understand and use than properly. Be 
wrote to his bishop, Valerius, plead;ng for time to stucly the Bible 
both for his own spiritual health and in order to be equipped for the 
work of the ministry. His inmersion in the sacred writings continued 
throughout his life and shaped his thol.¥fllt to a much greater degree 
than the other influences which we shall consider. 
It is clear that Au;Justine's perception of his need for the 
scriptures was not ta!p)rary. Be became increa.si.D;Jly preoccupied with 
the Bible and with ma.king the meaning of the text clear. Be published 
sermons, letters and fonnal treatises explaining this or that passage 
to his audience. Augustine's heavy reliance on the scriptures is 
evidenced by the ~e outpouri.D;J of exegetical works which oocurred a 
very few years after his ordination. As TeBelle observes: 
A sudden surge of interest in the epistles of Paul beoanes 
awaz-ent about 394. In quick succession Augustine wrote an 
Exposition of Eighty-Four Propositions on the &:>istle to the 
Ranans, then an Exposition of the &:>istle to the Galatians, then an 
unfinished Exposition of the &:>istle to the Ranans, as well as 
discussions of Pauline problems in questions 66 ~ 68 of the 
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collection of responses to various questions. 1 
These "WOrks, ooupled with the many semons be preached including 
the first thirty-two of the Enarrationes in Psalm:>s and the De senoone 
Danini in monte, further illustrate his growiDJ preoccupation with the 
Bible. 2 BaboocJt points out haw it was Au';JUStine' s study of st. Paul 
and particularly of Ranans 9 that caused the ~e in his position on 
the freedan of the will. He writes that ''Beyond that, one may add, it 
was precisely his study of and writing on the Pauline text that became 
a vehicle for a func'lamental shift in his views on the interaction 
between God's grace and man's freedan. 113 
In light of this, I shall sketch Au';JUStine's treatment of RaDaDS 9 
as it is found in De diversis guaestionil:,us LXXXIII question 68 and 
EJqx>sitio guarundam propositionum ex &;,istola ad Rananos prepositions 
60-62. 4 I shall cx,rpare this with his treatment in De diversis 






Eu;Jene Teselle, Au:rustine the Theologian (Herder 
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:Ranans (A.O. 394-396)," Au:rustinian Studies Vol. 
10 (1979) p. 56, note 4. 
Bal:xx>ck, ''Augustine's Interpretation of Rauancz (A.O. 
394-396)," p. 56. 
BaboocJt in ''Augustine's Interpretation of :Ranans," 
p. 63 note 29, places De diversis guaestionibus 
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al~h be admits ''The relative dating is not 
secure." I shall follow his order. 
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Ranans 9 in De Diversis OUaestionibus LXXXIII 
In question 68 of De diversis guaestionibus LXXXIII AD;1UStine 
treats the verse, ''Oh Man, who are you to talk back to God?" 5 In 
doing so he refers to much of the same portion of Ranans 9 to which he 
will return two years later in De diversis guaestionibus ad 
Simplicianum. This, however, is his first treatment of this chapter 
which is so central in und~tandi :ng the means and purposes by which 
God chooses :individuals. 
Sinoe one person is chosen by God and another is not chosen, 
AD;1UStine reasons, there must be sane distinction between than. Where 
this distinction is located is of central concern. As we saw in Chapter 
r:v, in his expositing this text for Simplicianus, AD;1UStine locates the 
distinction in the free choice of God. There was no distinction in the 
individuals themselves which would warrant God's choosing one and not 
the other. In this earlier treatment, however, AD;1UStine maintained 
that this distinction must be scmewbere in the individual.. He writes: 
s 
By all means he bas mercy on wban he wants, but this will of God 
cannot be unjust. For it sprm;JS fran deeply hidden merits, 
because, even though sinners themselves have constituted a si.J¥;1le 
mass on acoount of the sin of all, still it is not the case that 
there is no difference among than. Therefore, although they have 
not yet been made righteous, there is sane preceding thiD;J in 
sinners whereby they are rendered worthy of righteousness, and 
again, there is sane preceding thing in other sinners whereby they 
are deserving of obtuseness. You have the same Apostle saying 
elsewhere: ''Because they did not see fit to have a knowledge of 
God, God gave than up to an unsound mind." God gave than up to an 
unsound mind- this is bow He hardened Pharoah's heart, and they did 
not see fit to have a knowledge of God- this is bow they showed 
Ranans 9:20. 
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thanselves worthy of beinq given up to an unsound mind. 6 
Au;1ilstine is clearly attribltinq God's choice of one and rejection 
of another to the merits of the individuals, even if these are ''deeply 
hidden." The difference between how God deals with one :individual and 
how He deals with another results fran sane difference that is within 
the individuals. Augustine does not explain, in this passage, mractly 
what the difference is which results in different merits, lJut only that 
it is "sane preoedirq thing'' which merits either righteousness or 
obtuseness. 
Au;Justine makes a point of assertinq that this is not in conflict 
with the Scripture which says that '"it is not of him who wills nor of 
him who runs, lJut of God who sbows mercy 1117 It is be.re, in arguing 
this point, that Augustine explains what the difference is within the 




For even if each person with petty sins or genuinely grave and 
mnerous sins, however many, is yet worthy of God's mercy by virtue 
of a great lament and the ~sh of repentance, this does not 
depend on himself, who would perish if abandoned, lJut on God who 
shows mercy and who canes in response to his prayers and anguish. 
For it is not eD0l¥1h to will except God show mercy; lJut God, who 
calls to peace, does not show mercy except the will bave preceded, 
because on earth peace is to men of good will. And since no one can 
will unless urged on and called, whether inside where no man sees, 
or outside throu;Jh the sound of the spoken word or throu;Jh sane 
visible signs, it follows that God produces in us even the willir.q 
itself. 8 
De diversis guaestionil::,us LXXXIII 68, 4, trans. 
David L. Mosher in The Fathers of the Church, Vol. 
70. (Washington D.c.: catholic University Press, 
1982) Hereafter Div ouaes. 
Div Quaes., 68, s, quoting JkJMDS 9:16. 
Ibid. 
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Apparently it is ''by virtue of urgent lament and the anguish of 
repentance'' that an individual beoanes worthy of God's mercy. But, as 
Au;1Ustine insists, the individual's salvation is in no way dependent 
upon the individual. If a person were left alone, he or she would be 
left in sin and would perish. only because God shows His mercy is a 
person rescued. God shows His mercy "in response to his prayers and 
anguish." The critical sentence in this passage is ''For it is not 
enough to will except God show mercy; mt God, who calls to peace, does 
not shaw mercy except the will have preceded ••• " Here AD;1Ustine 
stmnarizes his systan. First, it is in:possible to will to be righteous 
and to attain it without God's mercy. This is clearly in opposition to 
his earliest views which we discussed in which it aweared to be 
possible to imepeM~tly will to live rightly. 9 Au;1Ustine, here, 
preserves the view that the individual is dependent upon God for 
salvation. 
The second point in his systan is that the will of the individual 
precedes God's showing mercy. This is consistent with the position 
which we observed in De libero arbitrio Book III (written about the 
same time) in which it was possible for the individual to turn to God 
in order to receive divine aid, without His intervention. No 
intervention was needed for the turn:ing mt only after divine 
intervention was it possible to live rightly. As we saw, by the time 
Au;1Ustine wrote De diversis guaestioni.l:Jus ad Simplicianum, he held that 
the actual turning to God was also included in the mercy of God. 
In De diversis guaestioni.l:Jus LXXXIII question 68, AD;1Ustine held 
9 See R>• 40-41 above. 
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that the hllDim will precedes God's mercy. God bas mercy on those who 
will to turn to Him. The individual's turnm;J is not enough to merit 
righteousness, however. Only the mercy of God can bestow righteousness. 
This mercy is merited by an individual when be or she wills to turn to 
God. In this way the difference which results in sane individuals be:in;J 
chosen by God and others not be:in;J chosen resides in the individuals' 
wills. 
Rana.ns 9 in Expositio guarundam Propositionum ex &>istola ad Rananos 
In Augustine's work Expositio guarundam propositiom.n ex &>istola 
ad Rananos 60-63, be traces the same portion of :Ranans 9 which be dealt 
with in De diversis guaestionilJus LXXXIII and De diversis guaestionilJus 
ad Simplicianum. This work was written very close to the same time as 
the fo:cmer and, as a result, there is little difference in Au;JUStine's 
explanation of the text. Augustine writes: 
10 
''For when they were not yet born, nor had they done anything 
either good or evil, in order that the purpose of God's election 
might oontinue, not because of works but because of his call, she 
was told, 'the elder will serve the 'YO',D;1er', as it is written, 
'Jaoob I loved, but Esau I hated."' This moves sane people to think 
that the apostle Paul had done away with the freedan of the will, 
by which we earn the esteem of God by the good of piety, or offend 
him by the evil of impiety. For, these people say, God loved the 
one and hated the other before either was even l:>orn and could have 
done either good or evil. But we answer that God did this by his 
foreknowledae, by which be knows the character even of the 
unborn ... 10 J 
Expositio guarundam propositionum ex Epistola ad 
Rananos, 60, 1, trans. Paula Fredriksen Landes 
(Chioo, calif.: Scholars Press, 1982) Hereafter Prop 
ad Ran. 
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8eVeral thiD;Js must l:>e observed about this passage. First, and 
most obvious, Augustine insists that Paul did not eliminate the freedan 
of the will. 8eoond, it is by the freedan of the will that an 
individual either earns God's esteem or offends Him. Third, t:bo1.¥;1h the 
scripture indicates, ''God loved the one and bated the other before 
either was born," God is not unjust. Be has foreknowledge, even before 
they are born, of their future faith or illpiety. God's loving the one 
and bati.D;J the other seem,g to l:>e a response to the faith or illpiety 
which Be foreknows they will have. In this case, the faith or the 
iD;,iety seem,g to l:>e within the individual's power m'leper,dent of God's 
worltiD;J in the :individual's life. 
Augustine rejects the notion that it might l:>e the future good 
works of an :individual which God foreknows and to which Be respond,8-
Augustine siD;,ly states, "If God elected works, why does the ~le 
say that election is •not according to works?1111 since it is not the 
foreknowledge of good works which causes God to love the one, the role 
of good works must l:>e expJajned: 
11 
For this very reason, then, one should understand that we are able 
to do good works through love, and we have love through the gift of 
the Holy Spirit, as the Apostle himself says: ''For the love of God 
has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit, which has been 
given to us" (S:S). Therefore no one should glory in his works as 
~h they were his own, for he does than by the gift of God, 
since this love itself works good in him. What then has God 
elected? For if he gives the Holy Spirit, through whan love works 
good, to whaDe\7er he wishes, haw does he choose the Spirit, s 
recipient? If he does not choose according to merit, it is not 
election, for all are equal prior to merit, and no cboioe can be 
made between absolutely equal thi.D;Js. But since he gives the Holy 
Spirit on1y to believers, God indeed does not choose works, which 
he himself bestows, for he gives the Spirit freely so that through 
love we might do good, l::ut rather he chooses faith. For unless each 
Ibid., 60, 4. 
118 
one believes in him and perseveres in his williJ¥JMSs to receive, 
he does not receive the gift of God, that is, the ~y Spirit, 
whose pourJB1 forth of love enables him to do good. 
To do good works is a gift of God. They are a result of and not 
prior to God's intervention. Augustine insists, therefore, that it is 
not future good works which merit election. ~ine is asSl.llliD;J here, 
as in question 68 of De diversis guaestionil:Jus LXXXIII, that there JllllSt 
be a distinction between individuals in order for God to be just in 
choosiB1 one over another. He indicates this by the sentence, "If He 
does not choose acoordin;J to merit, it is not election, for all are 
equal prior to merit, and no choice can be made between absolutely 
equal ~-" This distinction is located in the individuals 
themselves. It is not their good works, since works cane fran the Holy 
Spirit. Rather, since it is to believers that He gives His Holy Spirit, 
Au;JUstine concludes that it is faith which God chooses. 
Au;JUstine discusses the relationship between God's call and man's 
free response: 
Moreover, the nature of grace is such that the call precedes merit, 
rea~ the sinner when he had deserved only damnation. But if he 
follows God's call of his own free will, he will also merit the 
Holy Spirit, ~h whcm he can do good works. And ranaining in 
the Spirit -no less also by free will- he will also merit life 
eternal, which cannot be marred by aey flaw. 
God's call canes first. The sinner does not initiate or deserve 
the call and therefore the call that is extended is an expression of 
God's grace. cmce the call is given, the individual responds "of his 
12 
13 
Ibid., 60, 5-10. 
Ibid., 60, 14, 15. 
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own free will." This free response merits the gift of the Holy Spirit 
and the subsequent ability to do good works. Here, as in his other 
treatments of Ranans 9, A1¥;JUStine attempts to reason in a mamer 
consistent with Ranans 9:15, '"Therefore it depmd'"I not on man's 
willin;J or nmning, l:lut on God's mercy. 11114 He writes: 
Paul does not take away the freedan of the will, l:lut says our 
will does not suffice unless God helps us, making us merciful so 
that we can do good works through the gift of the Holy Spirit, as 
he had just said above, "I will have mercy on whan I will have bad 
mercy, and I will show him CXIT'p'\SSion on whan I will have bad 
ocq:,assion. 11 For neither can we will unless we are called, nor 
after our callin;J, once we have willed, is our will and our rmming 
sufficient unless God both gives strength to our running and leads 
where he calls. Therefore, clearly, we do good deeds not by our own 
willin;J or running l:lut by the mercy of God, ~ our will 
(which alone can do nothin;J) is also present. 
~tine eq>hasizes that the freedan of the will is preserved. 
However, the will is not able to choose and attain right livin;J without 
God's intervention. anly God can enable a person to aCOClll)lish good 
God's work in the person's life. ~tine holds that it is in response 
to the initial call of God that a person freely wills to respond. 
In both of these early works on 'Ranans 9, ~ine insists that 
an individual's will can turn to God in response to His callin;J or the 
individual can refuse to respond by turning. ~tine does not 
distinguish between an effectual call and a non-effectual call, as he 
does in his De diversis guaestionibls ad Sinpl.icianum. The distinction 
which warrants the election of one and the rejection of another is 
14 
15 
Ibid. , 62, 1, quotin;J Ranans 9: 15. 
Ibid., 62, 1-4. 
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located in the individuals thanselves. It is their faith or lack of 
faith which determines their destinies. 
Ranans 9 in De Diversis ouaestionibls ad f:inpticianun 
Although we have already given a great amount of attention to 
Al.¥;1Ustine's exposition of Ranans 9 in De diversis guaestionil::u; ad 
Simplicianum, a brief overview of sane key points will help highlight 
haw Al.¥;1Ustine's use of the Scriptures influenced the developnent of his 
thought ex>ncernm;J the freedan of the will. It must be remembered that 
this text was written only two years after those which we have just 
discussed. The central issue in OCl'l'{Ylrm;J these three treatments of 
laoans 9 is where Al.¥;1Ustine locates the distinction which warrants the 
choosing of sane individuals and the rejection of others. 
we saw16 that Au;Justine, in this latest work, rejects the idea 
that the distinction between individuals is the faith that God 
foreknows one will have and the inpiety that God foreknows that the 
other will have. The distinction is not within the individual. at all. 




By the time he bad oauposed his answer to QUeStion TWo, he bad 
thought again about the passage in :Ranans (9:11) where Paul says 
that God loved Jacob and bated Esau before either was bom. This 
led him to the view that God DDlSt make His choice before the 
individual is in a position to turn to God of his own volition. It 
follows that man is given two things by grace: ~irst the power to 
will, and then the power to do what is willed. 1 
See pp. 83-85 above. 
G. R. Evans, A1RUStine OD Evil (cambridge: 
cambridge university Press, 1982), p. 169. 
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Au;JUStine writes: 
There oould :be no election on aocount of good works, according to 
which the purpose of God might stand. So ''not of works tut of him 
that calleth," that is, of God who justifies the ungodly by grace 
calling him to faith, "it was said to her, the elder shall serve 
the ~er." So that the purpose of God does not stand acoo~ 
to election, lJut election is the result of the purpose of God. 8 
Election is not acoording to works, faith or anything within the 
individual. It is entirely according to God's purpose. God chooses to 
save one and leave another. As we have seen, He sends an effectual 
calling to all those He chooses. He may send a non-effectual c::alling to 
those He does not choose or, to sane, He may send no calling at 
a11. 19 In this God is oanpletely just. He bestows the mercy of 
forgiveness on sane and not on others. It is analogous to lnmm 
transactions in which a creditor might choose to remit sane debts and 
not others. Justice is not oanpranised and mercy is expressed. 
By ocq>aring Au:11,lStine's ~ches, in three different works, to 
the same passage of scripture, it can :be seen bow his interaction with 
the text and his work at discovering its meaning influenced him to 
shift his position. Beyond this, bawever, there are places where he 
explicitly admits that it was his attention to the scripture which 
aided this developnent. The first of these is the oft-quoted text in 
18 
19 
.M Simp., I, Q. 2, 6. 
Au:11,lStine does not say whether God sends sane type 
of calling to every individual, in which case all 
those wban He does not choose would receive 
non-effectual callings, or whether sane get 
non-effectual callings and sane no calling at all. 
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the Retractationes in which he describes his workin;J on De diversis 
guaestionibus ad ~i,rplicianum, "In the solution of this question, I, 
indeed, lalx>red in defense of the free choice of the buman will; :but 
the grace of God oonquered •••• 1120 This indicates that it was the very 
act of laboring over these Scriptures in the writing of this work which 
was the occasion of his change in view. 
Another passage that :indicates that it was the Scripture which 
aided the developnent of Augustine's tbo\¥;Jht is found in chapter seven 
of De praedestinatione sanctorum. Altbo\¥;Jh the whole chapter oonsists 
of Au:1l,lstine's review of his fomer position and a defense of his 
mature view fran the Scriptures, I shall only cite a portion: 
For I did not think that faith was preceded by God's grace, so that 
by its means would be given to us what we might profitably ask, 
except that we could not believe if the proclamation of the truth 
did not precede; rut that we should oonsent when the gospel was 
preached to us I tbo\¥;Jht was our own doing, and came to us fran 
ourselves. And this my error is sufficiently indicated in sane 
small works of mine written before my episoopate •••• I had not very 
carefully sought, nor had I as yet found, what is the nature of the 
election of grace, of which the apostle says, ''A remnant are saved 
aCCX>rding to the election of grace." Which assuredly is not grace 
if any merits precede it; lest what is now given, not aCCX>rding to 
grace, rut aCCX>rding to debt, be rather paid to merits than freely 
given.21 
Au:1l,lstine, here, attributes his error to the fact that he had ''not 
very carefully sought." In the oontext, he is writing about seeking in 
the Scriptures. In fact he highlights Scriptural texts which influenced 
his chal¥Jes in thou;Jht. Assertions likes these, and the obvious shift 
20 
21 
Retr., II, 27. 
De praedestina.tione sanctorum III, 7, trans. Robert 
Ernest wallis in A select Library of Nicene and 
Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. V, (Di~: T & T 
Clark, reprint Grand Rapids, Mich.: F.erdmans, 1987) 
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in his exegesis of RaDanCJ 9 support the view that the Scriptures played 
a large role in the developnent of his views on God's grace and rnnan 
freedan. 
The Influence of A1.¥1UStine's 
Personal H:>ral stru.Nle 
During the first years after Al.¥1UStine was ocmverted to 
Christianity, he retained much of his Neo-Platonist perspective on the 
spiritual developnent of the indivic!ual.. This included the notion of a 
progressive and continuous spiritual ascent. It was hoped that 
happiness of the soul would be attained and enjoyed in this life. ID 
fact, Au;rustine sanetimes wrote as if it was not too far off in the 
future. As the years progressed, however, and especially after he 
became a priest, these early aspirations were seen as inp,ssible. As 
Peter Brown observes: 
22 
Ten years later this great hope had vanished. ''Whoever 
thinks", Augustine will then write, "that in this mortal life a man 
may so disperse the mists of bodily and carnal :ima.gin.m;Js as to 
possess the unclouded light of ~eless truth, and to cleave to 
it with the tmSWerVm;J constancy of a spirit wholly estranged fran 
the ocmnon ways of life -he understands neither What he seeks, nor 
who he is who seeks it." [de CODS. eva?XJ· rv, x, 20] 
Augustine, indeed had decided that he would never reach the 
fulfillment that he first thc>u;Jht was pranised to him by a 
Christian Platonism: he would never :inp)se a victory of mind over 
body in himself, he would never achieve the rapt contemplation of 
the ideal philosopher. It is the most drastic chim;Je that a man may 
have to accept: it involved nothing less than the~ of the 
bright future he thou;Jht he had gained at cassiciac:un. 
Peter Brown, p. 147. 
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A1.¥;JUStine came to see that the difficulty which plagues the lnmm 
will is much more severe than his Neo-Platoni sn would have thc:u;Jht 
possible. As be reviewed his life and spiritual pilgrimage in the 
Confessiones, mnerous passages leap out to attest to this difficulty. 
In one place be describes how a himing habit was developed: 
[H]e appeared to me not more brave than baWY, in ha~ thus 
discovered an opportunity of waiting on Thee only, which thing I 
was sighing for, tlms bound, not with the irons of another, but nr, 
own iron will. My will was the enemy master of, and thence bad made 
a chain for me and bound me. Because of a perverse will was lust 
made; and lust indulged in became custan [oonsuetudo or ''habit"]; 
and custan not resisted became necessity. By which links, as it 
were, joined together(~ Item it a "chain"), did a bard 
bondage bold me enthralled. 3 
As A1.¥;JUStine describes the progression fran the perverse will to 
lust, fran lust to custan and, finally, fran custan to necessity, be is 
not asserting a theory about sin as much as be is sharing his own 
experience. He states that it was he himself who was sighing for the 
opportunity to serve God. It was his will which bound him as with iron. 
He goes on and writes that ''Thus I came to understand, fran nr, own 
experience, what I bad read, how that 'the flesh lusteth 1tgainst the 
Spirit, and the Spirit ~gainst the flesh. 11124 These are not the 
reflections of a man who is optimistic about attaining spiritual 
oanpletion in this life, let alone the near future. 
While it is true that the Confessiones give us an inside look at 
Al.¥;JUStine's reflections on his own life and st.n.¥Nles, his experience 
of his own moral struggle can also be gleaned fran passing references 
23 
24 
Conf., VIII, 5, 10. 
Conf., VIII, 5, 11, quoting Galatians 5:17. 
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in his oorrespondenoe. For exanple ~tine writes with great insight 
on the power and subtlety of pride: 
For the man who bas not declared war 21gainst this enany bas no idea 
of its power; for if it be oatp:ratively easy to cUspense with 
praise so lo~ as it is denied to him, it is difficult to forbear 
fran be~ captivated with praise when it is offered •••• and yet, 
althou;h strenuously oontend~ with m'J adversary, I often receive 
wounds fran him when I am unable to put away fran myse3t the 
fascinat~ power of the praise which is offered to me. 5 
Pride was a sin which ~tine knew fran the inside, not as he 
knew the sins of his past which were put away upon his conversion, l:lut 
as a very present threat. Another sin to which he was tenl)ted was 
anger. He reveals to Profuturus the relationship between anger and 
hatred. His writ~ bas the flavor of one who is, himself, still 
struggl~ to be right in this area: 
And well do you know, U1'/ excellent brother, haw, in the midst of 
such offences, we must watch lest hatred of any one gain a bold 
upon the heart, and so not only hinder us fran pra~ to God with 
the door of our chamber closed, but also shut the door against God 
Himself; for hatred of another insidiously creeps upon us, while no 
one who is arx;JrY oonsiders his aD:Jer to be l.Dljust. For anger 
habitually cherished against any one becanes hatred, since the 
sweetness which is m:in:]led with what arpear:1 to be righteous anger 
makes us detain it lo~er than we ought in the vessel, lmtil the 
whole is soured, and the vessel itself is spoiled. 26 
While these are examples of Augustine's own moral struggles, in 
other places, he explicitly asserts that spiritual growth is a process 
which is never ocmplete in this life. He writes to Januarius that, 
"this is not actually OC111:>leted in us so lo~ as we are still 'groaning 
25 
26 
~-, 22, 8. 
Ibid., 38, 2. 
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within ourselves, and waitin;J for the adoption, to wit, the reda!ption 
of our body: ••• ,.,2 7 ~ine's spiritual growth will not be 
oaupleted in this life. As a result, ~ine urges h.:im to keep in 
mind that: 
[W] e are not to thinJ.t that we otght to be made happy and free fran 
all difficulties in this present life, and are therefore at liberty 
to nummir profanely again.crt. God when we are straitened in the 
thin1s of this world, as if He were not performing what He 
pranised •••• The new life, therefore, is meanwhile begun in faith, 
and maintained by hope: for it shall only then be perfect when this 
mortal shall be swallowed up in life, and death swallowed up in 
·--- 28 V1v1.AJry; • • • . 
COnfrontin;J his own moral s~le and realizing that the habits 
produced fran a life of sin are more powerful than he bad previously 
imagined very well may have oontributed to shaping Au:;JUstine' s 
perspective on the freedatl of his own will. Tb.is may also have 
influenced the developnent of his theory of lnmm freedan as well. As 
he fought against his own sbortoanings, he increasingly recngni2:ed his 
need for divine intervention. He needed it himself and he came to see 
that every person needed God's grace in order to overoane the habits of 
the soul and to turn to God. 
The Influence of Pastoral nity 
Not only was Au;Justine oonfronted with his own moral and spiritual. 
struggle, but his surprising ordination to the priesthood thrust h.:im 
27 
28 
Ibid., 55, 14, 25. 
Ibid., 55, 14, 26. 
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into the daily toil of pastoral life. His days became occupied with 
settling disputes amo~ the JDEIDbe't"S of his church as well as 
representing the interests and need of the church to those in civil 
authority. He also invested a great deal of energy in the sernK)1'\S he 
preached and letters he wrote. As he tried to help people live rightly, 
he was oonfronted, flgain, with the sl1.J3gishness of the blnan will. 
We pointed out that, very soon after his ordination, Au:;Justine 
appealed to Valerius for time to study the scripture. He SOl.qht this in 
order to aid his own spiritual growth, but also to be equipped to lead 
better his oo~egation. Far fran feeling that the pastoral task was an 
easy situation in light of his own skills and gifts, as he had 
previously thol.¥Jht, A11;1USti.ne admits that, "it is true that I did not 
at any earlier period know bow great was urJ unfitness for the arduous 
work which now disquiets and crushes urJ spirit. 1129 
As to his assessment of his fitness for the task, Au:;Justine 
writes: 
The things which I lack are so many, that I oould n:>re easily 
eminerate the things which I have than those which I desire to 
have. I many venture to say that I know and tmreservedly believe 
the doctrines perta~ to our salvation. But urJ difficulty is in 
the question bow I am to use this truth in ministering to the 
salvation of others, seeking what is profitabie not for myself 
alone, but for many, that they may be saved. 3 
standing before his oo~egation, A11;1USti.ne saw a people in 
various stages of Christian developnent. Few had apparently made as 
definitive a break with their pasts as had A11;1UStine. Prendiville 
29 
30 
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oc:mnents: 
It is certain that Au;JUStine's people were no a!¥]8ls; according to 
his sennons and letters they swore, fornicated, got drunk, lied, 
and were envious and superstitious. Little wonder that in this 
setting his idea of habit takes on a new and more earthy tone. 31 
A specific example of Au;JUStine's struggle with the wills of the 
individuals in his OO:D:Jregation is recorded in a lcm;J letter to 
Alypius, now bishop of Thagaste. Au;JUStine recounts his persistent 
preaching against the habit which his oo:D:Jregation bad of celebrating 
the feast of Iaetitia in gluttony and drunkenness. His plea.ding and 
frustration is evident throughout this letter. He writes: 
I asked further, with the deepest sorrow, haw it was that, although 
Moses the servant of God broke both the tablets of stone because of 
these rulers of Israel, I could not break the hearts of those who, 
though men of the New Testament dispensation, were desiring in 
their celebration of saints' days to repeat often the public 
perpetration of excesses of which the people of the Old ~t 
eoonany were guilty only once, and that in an act of idolatry. 
~ine describes his preaching as, ''Pathetically 
ranincUng'•, 33 11I charged than to oonsider ... 11 , 34 11I especially 
begged than ••• 11 , 35 ''And I pled with than .•• 11 • 36 This intensity of 
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I did not move than to weep by first weepin:J myself; l:lut while 
these th.iD:;Js were bein:J spoken, I own that, n:,ved by the tears 
which they began to shed, I myself could not refrain fran followiD;J 
their example. And when we had thus wept together, I concluded 'trJ 
sermon with full persuasion that they would be restrained by it 
fran the abuses denounced. 37 
Unfortunately, many of those who wept went back to gluttony and 
drunkenness the next day. It seezr:!d that Augustine's preachll¥J and 
pleadin.1 had failed. ~tine attrimtes this return to these sins to 
the power of the custan: 
Next morning, however, when the day dawned, which so many were 
accustaned to devote to excess in eatin:J and drinking, I received 
notice that sane, even of those who were present when I preached, 
had not yet desisted fran oanplaint, and that so great was the 
power of detestable custan with than, that, usin:J no o~ 
arglDSllt, they asked, ''Wherefore is this now prohil>ited?" 8 
The custan of sin was so powerful that it led to rationalization. 
People came up with excuses in order to ex>ntinue in the very sin over 
which they bad wept only a day earlier. Clearly, Augustine is 
ex>nfrontll¥J the weakness of the hunan will in a powerfully visible way. 
This letter is especially valuable because it records both ~tine's 
attanpts at leadll¥J his ex>l¥Jregation to holiness as well as the 
response of the people. The grip of the habit was more pc,werfu1 than 
the prea~ of ~tine and the people's aootional response. 
~ine records, however, that eventually those individuals came to 
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Another exanple of Au;Ustine's confrontation with the sluggish 
will of his ocm;regation concerns the habit of swearirq. In his work on 
the semon on the Mount, Au;Ustine addresses this as be explains the 
passage of scripture in which it is written: 
•~," says He, ''Ye have heard that it bath been said to 
them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shall 
perfonn unto the Lord thine oath: But I say unto you, SWear not at 
all; neither by heaven, for it is God's throne; not by the earth, 
for it is His footstool; neither by Jerusa.lan, for it is the city 
of the great Km;J. Neither shalt thou swear by thy bead, because 
thou canst not make one hair white or black. But let your 
ccmmmication be Yea, vea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than 
these oaneth of evil. 1139 
~tine writes of the habit of swearirq: 
And therefore let him who understands that swearirq is to be 
reckoned not amo~ ~ that are good, rut amo~ thirqs that are 
necessary, refrain as far as he can fran indul.girq in it, unless by 
necessity, when he sees men slow to believe what it is useful for 
them to believe, except they be assured by an oath •••• But no one 
learns, unless he has bad experience, how difficult it is both to 
get rid of a habit of swearirq, and ~ to do rashly what 
necessity sanetimes ccq>els him to do. 4 
SWearirq is to be avoided as far as is possible. This, ~ine 
admits, is not easily done. The habit is difficult to overoane. Peter 
Brown ocmnents, ''This campaign against swearirq, indeed, would have 
brought him up against the ocupulsive force of certain habits, quite as 
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himself points out the difficulty as he concludes the section on 
swearin;J, "[W] hat can be named or ~t of more lalx>rious and 
toilsane, where the believin; soul is strai.nm:;J every nerve of its 
industry, than the sulJdui.D3' of vicious habit? 1142 
These illustrations shaw bow AD;1UStine found his oon;regation to 
be seen~ngly ~ in the bindi~ habits of various vices. His 
persistent lalx>r in tryin;J to help them _ overoc:me these afforded him 
ample OR;>Ortunity to observe the power of habits and the weakness of 
the lnlDim will. It seems reasonable to postulate, since the significant 
developnent of Au;JUStine' s view of the freedan of the will oocurred 
durin;J the period of his priesthood and early episoopacy, that these 
observations oaiprised one influence on AD;1UStine as his view 
developed. 
In this chapter we have postulated three possible influences on 
the developnent of Au;JUStine's view of the freedan of the will between 
his conversion and his writin;J of the Confessiones. His intensive study 
of SCripture, his personal mral and spiritual 5t.ruNle and his 
laborin;J in his pastoral duties all may have contrimted to the shift 
we have observed fran the inccmpatibilist view to the CXl!pltibilist 
view of lnlDim freedan. 
. Conclusion 
we have traced the developnent of Au;JUStine's view of the freedan 
of the will fran his conversion to the writin;J of his Confessiones. We 
42 De senn mt., I, 18, 54. 
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have found that in the first years after his oonversion, be held an 
inc::,arpatibilist view of the freedan of the will. we have seen this in 
that he believed it was within the power of an individual to choose to 
turn to God or to refuse to turn to God. This act was free if it was 
voluntary and, at this time, ~ine meant by ''voluntary'' the freedan 
of indifference. An act oould not be necessary and voluntary at the 
same time. A person, then, had the ability to turn to God without any 
change in antecedent oonditions. It was not necessary for the mercy or 
grace of God to be present in order for the person to be able to turn 
to Him. 
After Al.J:1U9tine's ordination to the priesthood, we have seen that 
he still held to this inc::m:pat:ibilist view. Be still held that a 
voluntary act oould not be necessary. There Jm1St be freecbn of 
indifference. DuriD;J this period, however, Al.J:1U9tine recognized the 
power of the habits of the soul to hinder the lnmm will. It was 
possible for persons to get to the point where they oould not free 
themselves fran the habits they had freely developed. It is always 
possible to turn to God for divine aid in order to be free. 
After beoaniJVJ bishop, A1.¥Justine began to bold that it was not 
even possible to turn for divine aid without God's mercy beiD;J present. 
God's grace was seen as a necessary and sufficient oondition for a 
person to turn to Him. ~ine bad begun to bold the oc:mpatibilist 
view of the freedan of the will. 
We have also seen three factors which may have influenced this 
developnent in Augustine's thought. These are the Scriptures, his own 
moral struggle and the moral struggle he confronted in his 
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oo~egation. With these in mind it is not surprisi.J¥J that AD;JUstine's 
view of the freedan of the will underwent such a profound developnent 
in such a short time. 
AD;JUstine's investigation into the freedan of the bJnan will is 
marked with a deep desire to find the truth about the matter, as well 
as a drive to achieve consistency. These are evident in the persistence 
and thoroughness with which he approaches the topic. His willingness to 
go over and over the same grcnmd is an admirable daoonstration of solid 
scholarship. Be has aC0Clli)lished the JOOmnental task of setti.J¥J the 
problans out with clarity and relevance, as well as of proposi.J¥J a 
oanplex systematic solution. Any investigation into these issues would 
do well to begin with the saint fran Africa. 
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